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**INSTITUTIONAL CRISIS, RESOURCES GOVERNANCE AND ECONOMIC  
PROSPERITY IN AFRICA: CROSSING THE GREAT DIVIDE THROUGH  
POLYCENTRIC DEVELOPMENT PLANNING**

**By**

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## **Institutional Crisis, Resources Governance, and Economic Prosperity in Africa: Crossing the Great Divide through Polycentric Development Planning**

### **Abstract**

In spite of the existence of abundant resources across Africa, the long years of operations of international financial organizations in the continent and several reforms' declarations and commitments made by African leaders over the last four decades, economic development is still a mirage. Two major factors account for this problem. First is the persistent gap between stakeholders in development, which is predicated upon the centralized system of governance that separates African leaders from the rest of African peoples. The problem is largely a case of institutional dilemma as there is an absence of appropriate institutional mechanisms that could motivate African peoples to work together as partners in development. Second is the adoption of and reliance on Eurocentric development paradigm by African state and African university, which supports state-dominated and state-driven economy. Consequently, most economic and political decisions in Africa do not reflect the wishes and aspirations of the people whose potentials remained largely untapped. As expected, Africa is one of the regions in the world where development and poverty reduction are lagging.

The failure of most of the past development paradigms, state-centered efforts and market economy requires a rethink on alternative ways of addressing African socioeconomic and political problems as well as its resources governance challenges. Market forces alone are incapable of addressing these problems. Social capital plays an indispensable role as well. Using the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework, this paper employs both theoretical formulations and empirical evidence to analyse the missing links in the operations of the key development actors within African political economy. This article is problem-solving and solution-seeking designed to bridge the gaps between African leaders and the citizenry on the one hand, and between development potentials and welfare-oriented development on the other hand. It is in this light that the paper suggests the need to restructure the socio-economic and political landscape for the emergence of a new working relation between public officials, scholars and citizens in Africa. This new working relation requires that these actors adopt alternative development strategy that is Africentred, people-centred, inward-looking and community-oriented.

The paper, therefore, adopts African Development Brain-Box (ADBB) that relies on African Polycentric Development Planning (APDP) in synergising the efforts of the key stakeholders in harnessing development potentials. Further, the paper adopts African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) that could help in restructuring the public sphere for synergy and African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM) for assessing the performance of African politicians at the constituency level. Further the paper highlights fourteen (14) African development models that are problem-solving and solution seeking. Among them are: African Development Institutional Mechanism (ADIM), African Food Security Model (AFSM), African Electoral Reform and Democratisation (ARED), etc. Such home-grown models develop(ed) by African scholars would need to be applied on pilot scale so that findings and experiences gathered from these pilot cases would help in refining and modifying the models for full replication across the continent.

Specifically, the paper employs African Food Security Model (AFSM) that focuses on the mechanism to combine factors of production - (land, labour, capital, entrepreneurship and technology). Under this proposed arrangement, it is strongly believed that by networking with stakeholders, agricultural innovations from universities would be developed by industrialists and consequently, popularized by governments among peasant farmers. The adoption of innovations by peasant farmers would help in transforming agricultural resources into semi-finished and/or finished products. This will reduce wastages; strengthen economic capacity of peasants, thus, enhancing higher productivity in farming and food security in Africa.

## **Introduction**

*Underdeveloped countries should not accept the inherited Western economic theory uncritically but remould it to fit their own problems and interests (Myrdal 1957:99).*

This article is a problem-solving and solution-seeking paper designed to bridge the gaps between African leaders and the citizenry on the one hand and between theories and realities on the other hand. This becomes critical in the light of protracted governance and developmental crises that Africa has been subjected. These crises are engendered by the 'disconnect' and alienation. The problems of disconnect and alienation in Africa reinforce the notion that the highly centralized governance structure in the continent makes it difficult for the policies and operations of African governments to impact positively on the lives of the citizenry. African states are more highly centralized than any of the other world's regions (Olowu 2006:7). As a matter of fact, no

appreciable progress has been made in spite of all the Declarations and Resolutions made by African leaders over the last four decades to address persistent socio-economic and techno-political crises in the continent. The state-dominated and state-driven economy has no mechanism and inspiration to rally the large percentage of African citizenry and their institutions, which are in the informal sector, around socio-economic and political projects (Akinola 2007f:218).

Consequently, the public space was monopolised by the so-called leaders for the entrenchment of Western ideologies that have traumatized the continent of Africa. For instance, the Bretton Wood Institutions - the World Bank and the IMF – have introduced four programmes in Africa within the last three decades. The programmes are decentralisation, the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the Policy Support Instrument (PSI).

As a result, sub-Saharan Africa is a very small player in the global economy. As at 2005's exchange rates sub-Saharan Africa produced only 1.4% of global GDP in 2005 and had an average per capita income that was 1/41 of that of the high income countries. Africa is clearly the poorest region in the world. This, invariably, affects savings and thus reduces investment and development. As a result, official financial flows or aid were US\$30.5 billion in 2005, foreign direct investments were US\$16.6 billion and other private transfers, which include various forms of private remittances amounted to US\$9.8 billion (Bigsten and Durevall (2008:7).

While a group of scholars and analysts believe that African crisis is caused by bad governance and/or bad leadership, others (such as Jeffrey Sachs, McArthur, Schmidt-Traub, Kruk, Bahadur, Faye and McCord) argue that Africa is caught up in a poverty trap. That is, the poor African performance is due to poverty explained by lack of resources and skills (Sachs, et. al., 2004). These theoretical formulations are erroneous and misleading. The position of this paper is that these two schools of thought have addressed the challenges in Africa at superficial level. Neither poverty trap school nor bad governance/leadership theory has done a deeper analysis of the challenges that are confronting Africa. The contention of this paper is that analysis should not end on bad governance or bad leadership. The question is: What causes bad governance? Some might want us to believe that bad governance is due to bad leadership. This is also superficial due to some reasons (as explained later in this paper). On the poverty trap school, is lack of resources and skills the problem in Africa? Is this assertion correct on Africa? No. There are abundant resources and well talented

people in Africa (as we shall see later in this paper). The Public Choice Theory (PCT) believes that governance and developmental crises are predicated upon institutional dilemma that originated in the colonial settings.

It becomes increasingly evident, however, that these theoretical formulations, Western ideologies and paradigms were inadequate to diagnose African challenges not to talk of proffering solutions that could produce balanced socio-economic, political and technological development. Two peculiar features that are common to all these paradigms are: (1) they did not capture informal statistics that reflect African daily economic activities and (2) economic decisions are taken at the seat of power (usually at the capital) far away from the local people. That was(is) why development planning and planning models adopted so far in Africa have not worked as expected. They were state-centred and foreign driven. The ingredients of development that reside with African scholars and the local people were sidelined by the state. Potentials and skills of African scholars in forms of innovation and knowledge as well as self-organising arrangements and local knowledge that diverse peoples of Africa have evolved over the years were neither recognised by officialdom in Africa nor connected to the state structure of governance where these potentials and capabilities could be harnessed for development.

As expected, development planning strategies were devoid of institutional mechanisms and planning frameworks that could enhance maximum utilisation of resources and actualise the fruits of economic growth in the lives of the citizenry; thus, perpetuating inequalities (Akinola 2008p). The position of this paper is that centrally and externally motivated strategies lead to increasing economic and technological dependency, heightened mass poverty and choking of local initiatives. The problem is largely a case of institutional dilemma as there is an absence of appropriate institutional mechanisms that could motivate African peoples to work together as partners in development. This institutional dilemma confirms the problem of “disconnect” in the continent. As long as stakeholders in development are not operating in synergy, development is forgone.

In spite of these challenges, this paper identifies development potentials, which include: natural resources potentials, innovations potentials and institutional potentials. Unfortunately, these development potentials are largely untapped and Africa, thus, becomes a dumping ground for goods that it could produce locally. Predictably, instead of development and enhancement of citizen's

welfare; poverty, hunger, conflicts and sickness are heightened across the continent. If it is true that university education and generation of knowledge are at the heart of development and African scholars have potentials, why is it that African continent still lags behind other regions in the area of development in spite of the existence of over 250 universities in Africa? Is it not the time to begin rethinking new development paradigms that are capable of bridging the gap between the major development players in Africa? The puzzle raised by this paper is whether African societies are really capable or not of attaining redemptive development from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their progress on accident and force dictated by whims and caprices of foreign financial institutions.

The failure of the past development paradigm, state-centered efforts and market economy requires a rethink on alternative ways of addressing African socioeconomic, political and technological problems. Market forces alone are incapable of addressing these problems; social capital plays an indispensable role as well. Since it is difficult for individuals to change certain exogenous variables (physical environment in particular), individuals usually adopt and adapt institutions based on their life exigencies. This is where the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework becomes relevant for sustainable development in Africa. The specific variation used in this paper draws from the IAD framework developed over the years by Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom and colleagues at the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, USA. Institutional analysis helps us to better understand how individuals within communities, organizations and societies craft rules and organize the rule-ordered relationships in which they live their lives. This approach to scientific inquiry, often referred to as “new institutionalism,” is within the broader tradition of political economy.

Resources governance depicts how leaders and the people respond to resources that are endowed within their environment. The major key sectors that constitute the development of any society are government, university, industry and agriculture, while the key players in these sectors are governments’ officials, scholars, industrialists and farmers respectively. These groups should of necessity interact within socio-economic and political action arenas. The bane of African governance and development is that these stakeholders (the key players) called participants within development arenas have not been interacting; hence, there is no collective response to exogenous variables that they needed to deal with. Rather, they operate more or less along parallel lines;

individual player has been responding to exogenous variables in a disjointed and adjusted incrementalistic manner. Consequently, development potentials that are associated with collective action within the action arena have been eluding Africa as a continent (Akinola 2007f:219).

This paper interrogates AU, NEPAD, ECOWAS, SARDC, etc. on the impact they have generated on diverse peoples of Africa. In spite of its responsibility to promote democratic principles and good governance in the continent, what measures AU, for instance, have taken in detecting and preventing conflicts across the continent? How has AU handled crises that border on resources allocation and distribution in places like the Niger Delta in Nigeria, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Darfur, etc? Similarly, where is the impact of NEPAD, whose mandate resonates around increasing prosperity and eradicating poverty in the face of African youth crossing the Sahara desert and Meditenarian Sea to Europe? What has NEPAD done in the area of job creation when graduates in Africa have to ride *Okada* (motorcycle) as commercial taxi in order to survive economically? Evidence abounds of graduates of higher institutions that work as labourers in building industry – carrying blocks, water and cement. What a wasteful continent that de-prioritises scholarship and knowledge!

Despite the shortcoming of the state institutions in responding to the yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry, diverse peoples of Africa are still surviving through several coping strategies and self-organizing arrangements in the same areas where the state has faltered. The people were able to achieve these by reviving their old traditions and through shared strategy, problem-solving interdependency and self-organizing arrangements were able to achieve modicum level of success in social services and market management. Through these strategies, the people, to an extent, have provided and produced infrastructure such as schools, health facilities, community hall, postal service, road repairs and other essential services (Olowu, Ayo and Akande, 1991; Bratton 1989, 1990, 1994; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Olowu and Erero, 1997; Adedeji, 1997; Coulibally, 1999; Adedeji and Ayo, 2000; Ayo, 2002; Olowu and Wunsch, 2004; Sawyer, 2005; Akinola, 2000, 2003a, 2004, 2005d, 2007a,f, 2008b, 2009a,b, 2010a,b). Unfortunately, these democratic people-oriented values are neither properly documented nor recognized by official statistics in Africa.

The fundamental questions that come to mind include: How are diverse peoples of Africa coping economically and socially? How are the people surviving regarding basic needs like food, housing,

clothing, health, education, transport, security, etc.? What kind of incentives favour trusted institutional arrangement among the people? How do people resolve their conflicts? What lessons can we learn from peoples' creativities and the adaptive strategies they evolved over the years in addressing problems of daily existence?

Using the IAD framework, this paper employs empirical data to discuss repetitive missing links between and among the three key development actors (African leaders, African scholars and the citizenry) in Africa. It also adopts African Development Brain-Box (ADBB) that relies on African Polycentric Development Planning (APDP) in synergising the efforts of the key stakeholders in harnessing development potentials. APDP conceptualizes development based on synergetic interactions of key development actors within development arenas. It deviates from centralized and state-centred development planning that characterizes African state. APDP as an adaptation strategy, helps in matching the output/product of scholars and industries with the needs of the grassroots. In order words, the supply of scholars and industries are related to the demand of the grassroots. This strategy, as a bottom-up development strategy, has been proven and tested in Irepodun Local Government area of Osun State, Nigeria (Akinola 2007f; 2010a,b). For example, Zimbabwe, having driven away the White Farmers from the country, needs a system that can make the people utilize the land productively in meeting the yearning and aspirations of the citizenry.

The major concern of this paper, therefore, is to use African Polycentric Development Planning (APDP) as a tool in designing multi-layered and multi-centered institutional arrangement to bridge the gaps between key development actors within development arenas in Africa. This paper is organised into six sections. The first part is the introduction, while the second section discusses the theoretical underpinning upon which the paper is anchored. The third part discusses how institutional crisis and the problem of disconnect have engendered crises of resources governance and elusive development in Africa, while economic development potentials in Africa are examined in the fourth section. The fifth section delves into how to cross the great divide between African leaders and their peoples on the one hand, and between development potentials and economic prosperity on the other hand. The sixth section contains the conclusions.

## Theoretical Underpinning

*...no two communities are ever the same and people always bear some marks of their origin. Circumstances of birth and growth affect all the rest of their careers (Tocqueville 1966:31). The fact that a model worked in the West does not suggest its workability elsewhere (Akinola 2008p:174).*

In order to contextualize the line of analysis in this paper, Public Choice Theory (PCT) is adopted. The PCT recognizes the fundamental defects in the centralist model of governance and the persistent failure of the state to meet the collective yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry. In view of this, the Public Choice Scholars have consistently advocated “de-emphasising the state as the sole focus of political theory and policy analysis” (Ayo 2000:23). The position of the Public Choice Scholars is that effective governance and meaningful socio-economic development can best be attained in human societies through systems of democratic administration. The main thrust of democratic administration is the people and a people - managed system of governance. It is based on the assumption of eligibility of every individual to participate in the conduct of public affairs.

As a result, the Public Choice scholars have called attention to the self-governing and self organising capabilities of the people. Though this alternative paradigm was originally conceived within the context of American experience, it has become a potent alternative effectively employed by African scholars in their works (Ayittez 1991; Olowu 1999, 2006; Ayo 2002; Sawyer 2005; Akinola 2004, 2007a,f, 2008b, 2009a,b, 2010a,b). These scholars have confirmed the resilience and effectiveness of institutions designed and managed by the people. Those community institutions are found to have performed better than state run institutions, and that community based institutional arrangements readily meet the yearnings and aspirations of the people in delivering goals and services which the state run institutions have failed to deliver efficiently and effectively.

This is opposed to the monocentric system of bureaucratic administration, which has one centre of authority. A system of democratic administration is characterized by a system of polycentricity, which empowers the citizens to organize self governing institutions, nested within one another (Wunsch and Olowu 1995:2). The Monocratic assumptions of Max Weber were intensely challenged by Alexis de Tocqueville’s study of Democracy in America. The study brought to light the resilience and effectiveness of democratic administration characterized by polycentricity (Vincent Ostrom 1974:69). Having been impressed by the nature of American Democracy, which allowed for people-oriented and people-centered government, Alexis de Tocqueville, asserts that the

fundamental basis for the constitution of order in human societies is the people, not the state. The study clearly shows the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of “monocratic principles” in the constitution of order in human society. Alexis de Tocqueville focuses on the polycentric approach to the constitution of order in human society where people share a community of understanding in proffering solutions to their own problems of daily life with adequate propensities and capabilities in a rule-ordered relationship (Vincent Ostrom et. al. 1988:51).

It is the view of Tocqueville that monocentric governance gives rise to despotism and dictatorial systems. This view finds relevance in many African countries where dictators had ruled and committed crimes against humanity. Such rulers include: Idi Amin and Milton Obote of Uganda; Ibrahim Babangida and Sanni Abacha of Nigeria; Charles Taylor of Liberia; Hissène Habré of Chad, Jean Kambanda of Rwanda; Mengistu Haile Mariam of Ethiopia, etc. In view of this, Tocqueville advocates for “a new science of politics”. The new science of politics, being advocated, according to Vincent Ostrom, is a science of association that enables people to design, create and maintain systems of governance where they can be self-governing (McGinnis 1999:24).

The Public Choice Scholars therefore emphasise that the state and its formal structures should concentrate on the provision of public goods and services, but they not be directly involved in their production. The most important role of government, in a polycentric order, according to them, is to help local people resolve their conflicts of interest in a way that remains consistent with societal standards of fairness. The emphasis is that individuals under certain institutional arrangements and shared norms are capable of organizing and sustaining cooperation that advances the common interest of the group in which they belong (see, for example, E. Ostrom 1990).

This line of thought recognizes that human beings can organize and govern themselves based on appropriate institutional arrangements and mutual agreements in a community of understanding. This is the fundamental of the Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. The IAD believes in institutional arrangement designed by people who cooperate based on rules and constitution of their choice; and are thereby able to resolve socio-economic and political problems which other people (external to their conditions) are not capable of doing for them.

Institutions are the prescriptions (rules) that humans use to organize all forms of repetitive and structured interactions including those within families, neighbourhoods, markets, firms, sports leagues, churches, private associations, and governments at all scales. Individuals interacting

within rule-structured situations face choices regarding the actions and strategies they take, leading to consequences for themselves and for others (Commons 1968; E. Ostrom 2005:18).




Fig. 1. A Framework for Institutional Analysis.

Source: Adapted from E. Ostrom, Gardner, and Walker 1994, 37.

As shown in fig. 1, institutions are crafted by participants within action arenas in response to their particular exogenous variables. This normally starts when participants within an action arena respond to exogenous variables or context (biophysical/material conditions, cultural and other attributes of a community, and rules-in-use) and when outcomes are positive the participants will increase their commitment to maintain the structure as it is or to another set of exogenous variables and then on and on like that. However, if outcomes are negative, participants might raise some questions on why the outcomes are negative. They might then move to a different level and change their institutions to produce another set of interactions and consequently, different outcomes.

Since society is a system of human cooperation, people in any society should collectively relate to and deal with their exogenous variables. Exogenous variables are those conditions that affect human livelihoods and which humans have to work upon through appropriate institutional arrangements to better their conditions of existence. However, within action arenas there are some fundamental imperatives of collective action. These are collegiality, mutual trust, reciprocity and shared

community of understanding.

To better explain the diagram in Figure 1, an example of community of pastoralists and farmers in an arid environment is illustrated. Pastoralists and farmers need water for their cattle and their farmland. Their biophysical/material condition is lack of water while the action situation is the need to make water available. But rules are necessary to ensure equitable distribution to all members of the community. The way the rules are formulated is crucial. If the process is dominated by a few, then the outcomes of interactions will not be beneficial to all members. Those marginalized will not understand the rationale for the rules and may resist cooperating. But if all members of the community are involved in rule making, compliance and monitoring will be equally shared and everyone is more inclined to ensure the success of the project. This type of self-organizing arrangement can be applied to other human activities such as cooperative societies, provision and production of community projects and public goods (see Akinola 2007f). According to Elinor Ostrom (2005:3) understanding institutions is a process of learning what they do, how and why they work, how to create or modify them, and eventually how to convey that knowledge to others.

*The opportunities and constraints that participants face in any particular situation, the information they obtain, the benefits they obtain or are excluded from, and how they reason about the situation are all affected by the rules or absence of rules that structure the situation. Further, the rules affecting one situation are themselves crafted by individuals interacting in deeper-level situations. **It is important that rules ‘crafters’ understand the interplay between actions and outcomes as the duo interlink.** On the other hand, if individuals who are crafting and modifying rules do not understand how particular combinations of rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular ecological and cultural environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and, at times, disastrous outcomes (Elinor Ostrom 2005:3). (Emphasis added).*

To understand institutions, according to (E. Ostrom 2005:3), one needs to know what they are, how and why they are crafted and sustained, and what consequences they generate in diverse settings. Understanding institutions is a process of learning what they do, how and why they work, how to create or modify them, and eventually how to convey that knowledge to others. It is important, however, that rules ‘crafters’ understand the interplay between actions and outcomes as the duo interlinked. On the other hand, if individuals who are crafting and modifying rules do not understand how particular combinations of rules affect actions and outcomes in a particular ecological and cultural environment, rule changes may produce unexpected and, at times, disastrous outcomes.

Relating institutions to Africa, all nation-states created in Africa and rules that sustained them were inspired by European traditions, while the peoples in diverse language communities and ways of life in Africa were ignored (V. Ostrom 2006) and their governance structures were denigrated. The elite leadership that took over the mantle of leadership after independence followed the footprints of colonial masters in their leadership style, while their people (Africans) relied on their indigenous governance structures. Consequently, the house fell apart. While leaderships in these nation-states were grappling with the problems of political instability occasioned by *coups d'état*, military dictatorships and presidential authoritarian system, the peoples of Africa survived through communal and cooperative efforts in various ecological and cultural settings. This is where elite leadership in Africa could not respond appropriately especially after independence. Incidentally, the peoples of Africa have been able to respond to challenges by exploring pre-colonial governance heritage and to certain extents have been able to address their daily needs.

The ways and manners African leaders exercise leadership prerogatives in decision making at the exclusion of the people shows that the house is divided against itself. The elite (public officials and scholars) are divided against themselves and the elite as a group is separated from the grassroots. This wide gap between state and society is manifested in different cultural values prevailing within the bureaucracy as against the rest of society (Macmullan, 1970; Ekeh, 1975). These two contradictory sets of values make public officials “polynormative”, and in many cases translate into “normlessness” (Riggs 1962:29-30), corruption and personal aggrandizement (Riggs 1964, 1973). The Development Bank of South Africa (DBSA) also corroborates this position when it states that part of colonial legacies had entrenched a culture of public service and governance that has not put the interests of the indigenous people first. In some cases, post-colonial African elites have used these entrenched systems to plunder national resources, while disregarding democratic norms and traditions (DBSA 2006:vi).

After independence, African ruling elites gave top priority to state sovereignty and national security and sought to bring about “departicipation”. In spite of elites efforts to discourage autonomous organizations from taking root in civil society, in many places, voluntary associations proved too strong to be subordinated and survived as an alternative institutional framework to officialdom. The poor performance of planned economies in Africa gave an added impetus to autonomous activity beyond the purview of the state.

It is important at this juncture to point out that this colonially engineered misfortune had denigrated and denied Africa the development that existed in pre-colonial period. It has been documented that Africa once had several flourishing empires (that could compare with European empires) before colonial intrusions. Rodney (1976) shows that Africa has its own institutions and ideas of government before the intrusion of colonising powers. There were cases of flourishing, well-ordered and wealthy empires, kingdoms and city states (see for details Rodney 1976:40). These empires and kingdoms operated federal systems of governments; otherwise the trans-Saharan trade couldn't have succeeded under unitary systems of governments. This confirmed Africa's precolonial development which Eurocentric scholarship sought to deny. Thanks to Cheikh Anta Diop who successfully struggled against this erroneous, misleading and flawed Eurocentric scholarship which tended to obscure the contributions of ancient black Egyptians to world civilization and re-established an Africentric epistemology as a liberating process (see Nabudere 2007:6,13; Sertima 1986:8; Carruthers 1999:3).

It is in this line that Vincent Ostrom, an American Professor Emeritus of Political Science argues that:

*If Africans were to concern themselves more with covenanting with one another to form civil bodies politic, they would appreciate that African peoples draw upon diverse ways of conceptualising patterns of order in their societies. There is as much to be learned from stateless societies as from those that merged as "kingdoms" and "empires" before the intrusion of European empires. Modern democratic societies cannot be imposed from the top. They emerge as people learn to cope with the problems of collective organisation associated with their shared interdependencies (Vincent Ostrom 1991:18).*

In the opening paragraph of *The Federalist Papers*, Hamilton ([1788] 1961:33) posed the fundamental puzzle in human societies, "whether societies of men are really capable or not of establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether they are forever destined to depend for their political constitutions on accident and force." If we understand society as a system of human cooperation, this Hamiltonian puzzle can be formulated and applied to Africa as two questions: Are peoples of Africa capable of cooperating with one another to organize people-oriented system of governance that will harness resources and citizens potentials for development? If the answer is affirmative, under what conditions can they cooperate to achieve such a goal? Are there some roles citizens should play in decisions that pertain to resources utilization and development? What are these roles? How can the public space be planned and reconstructed to

allow citizens at community level to be involved in decision making, rule-monitoring and enforcement of sanction on rule infraction? What role should citizens at community level play in policy making, for example? The argument is that until the public sphere in Africa is reshaped, reconstructed and reconfigured, policies will not be people-focused. Consequently, instead of policies being democratic; tyranny of the majority will continue to predominate; and peoples of Africa, regardless of their endowment and entrepreneurial capability, will continue to suffer, while violence, insecurity and poverty will be heightened.

If we agree that institutions matter in terms of their influence on cooperation, then self-organizing and self-governing arrangements that diverse peoples of Africa have adopted in cooperating mutually in responding to their common problems are imperatives as the first condition to be met for the attainment of good governance on resources utilization and distribution as well as sustainable development in Africa. The kind of incentives that promote cooperation, mutual relationships, and collective action among these communities of individuals in Africa is the second condition that needs to be met before diverse peoples of Africa can cross the hurdles in their passage to mutually productive ways of life and people-centred development.

Some of the questions raised in this paper need to be answered by African scholars through empirical surveys in their various disciplines. Findings from such studies will help us come to terms with the resilience and robustness of African peoples as well as their vulnerability, exclusion and marginalization. This will produce a new body of knowledge that is Africentred and necessary for decisions and policies that can positively touch the lives of African people. Alex de Tocqueville has reminded us that: "...no two communities are ever the same and people always bear some marks of their origin. Circumstances of birth and growth affect all the rest of their careers (Tocqueville, 1966). The fact that a model worked in the West does not suggest its workability elsewhere (Akinola 2008p:174).

Scholars of African development then have an important challenge to think carefully about what works as opposed to what does not work if the individual in Africa will be helped in taking advantage of self-governing lessons learned in local units for political and economic transformation of the continent. The study of self-governance and human capabilities in a range of human endeavours in African societies should be of particular interest to African scholars to explore

research puzzles of mutual interest and to cooperate in ways that are mutually productive and rewarding. For Africa to be self-governed, diverse and multiple centres of human activities that African peoples have established should be of significant interest to African scholars. They need to pay attention to indigenous and endogenous political economy structure and second, extract governance principles which can be modified to suit the present day realities. Models that will take cognizance of these self-governing arrangements and multiple centres of human activities should be first developed by African scholars and then apply to development.

These multiple centres of human activities resemble what Elinor and Vincent Ostrom (2003:12) describe as polycentricity. Polycentricity simply means a system where citizens are able to organize, not just one, but multiple governing authorities, as well as private arrangements, at different scales. In a polycentric system, some units are general-purpose governments, whereas others may be highly specialized. Self-organized resource governance systems, in such a system, may be special districts, private associations, or part of local government.

It is important to sharp the contrasts between decentralization and polycentricity/self-governance here. Decentralization does not mean the same thing as self-governance though the two may embrace one another if the operators mean well. It is possible for decentralization structures to accommodate the self-governing principle. However, post-independent African governments have tended to exclude the elements of self-governance from their concepts of decentralization. While decentralization is state-centered and outward looking, self-governance is people-oriented and inward looking. Decentralization as a World Bank agenda, though regards local governments as participatory institutions, in practice it is more of extension of central government to the local level where bureaucracy and machine politics prevailed. In this version, the local government system is a field administration as its working mechanism lacks democratic value; it is a centralized system at the grassroots. Further, the decentralization and good governance of both the World Bank and African Development Bank have not properly recognised the missing link in African local government systems. Overwhelming evidence confirmed that most African countries operate a centralized local government within a decentralized system as these third tiers of government have no interactive links with community institutions. Evidence abound that decentralization across Africa (in Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and Uganda, etc.) is a failure as it lacks the mechanisms that could enable the people and their elite leadership to work together as citizens of the same country.

Invariably, party patronage, embezzlement, improper use of council property and facilities, corruption and consequently poverty have been heightened (Ayee 1999b; 2006:137; Makara 2000; Devas and Grant 2003; Golooba-Mutebi 2004; Wunsch and Ottemoeller 2004; Akinola 2004; Olowu 2006).

It is apposite at this juncture to discuss development planning before it is linked with polycentric planning. Development planning, according to Wikipedia Encyclopedia, is a multidisciplinary branch of social science that emerged as an academic discipline in the second half of the twentieth century to address issues of social and economic development in developing countries after decolonisation. This became apparent as a result of the realisation that economics alone could not fully address issues such as political effectiveness and educational provision in the era of modern development where knowledge and skill are imperatives to relieve the suffering of the people. Since it was considered imperative by scholars of development studies to integrate ideas of politics and economics, governance and the conduct of community affairs are essential elements of development studies. The purpose of development planning, therefore, is to allow initiatives by the public and private sectors as well as community organisations to be carried out more often and in a better way. Therefore, development planning is conceptualized to transcend the physical dimension of planning to include socio-economic and political issues such as the conduct of community affairs, social services provision, poverty reduction, food security, employment generation, security of life and property, etc.

Polycentric planning and decision making system enhance the capacity of citizens to talk, discuss, dialogue and engage in contestation in an assembly, whether at local or national level. It deals with multiple units of governments (multi-layers and multi-centers) and a way of working with one another among citizens with complementary arrangements for formulating, using, monitoring, judging, and enforcing rules (Elinor Ostrom 2005). If such institutions are granted autonomy, it will enhance effective collaboration, self-regulation and accountability (Wunsch and Olowu 1995:123). Since all socio-economic and techno-political issues have their bearing and tentacles at the community level, polycentric planning enhances the chance of bridging the gaps between policies and realities as well as harnessing African potentials using community institutions as agents of change. However, the four fundamental imperatives of collective action within development arena – collegiality, mutual trust, reciprocity and shared community of understanding – should be worked

upon and entrenched in Africa. It is the realization of these imperatives through constitutional reforms, effective development planning and institutional arrangements that can enable Africans (leaders and the peoples) to work together to achieve redemptive development for the continent.

Though there is a growing awareness of the need to strengthen community institutions which have existed and have facilitated self-reliant development at the local level, these institutions in Africa exist at grassroots without official connection with the state-based institutions. They operate on parallel line with governments, their agencies and multinationals. Under normal circumstances, these people-oriented institutions and governments should operate in synergy as stakeholders in development and colleagues with equal standing within socio-economic and political arenas. This, however, has not been the case. What has been happening is that government officials dominate decision making arena and decided for the people who have a well established structure of community self-governance (see Akinola 2008b, 2009a,b, 2010a,b). If these institutions are viable (though not perfect), the question then is how do we connect them to the formal government structure?

In the light of the above, the next section discusses how institutional crisis and the problem of disconnect have engendered crisis of resources governance and development dilemma in Africa.

### **Institutional Crisis, Resource Governance and Elusive Development in Africa**

The present crisis of resources governance and elusive development in Africa are predicated upon repressive institutional order that disconnects the peoples of Africa from their leaders. The post-independent African states as constituted are not designed and equipped to respond to the needs of African people as they are unable to articulate transforming projects or mobilize societies around such projects. Policies adopted since political independence have reinforced the state institutional character and its inability to progressively enhance the living standards of majority of the African population. The elite are alienated in terms of the educational curriculum introduced by the colonial governments. The curriculum did not pay much attention to the study of African culture, its roots and adaptive education that can help the society to release the potentials and capabilities of the African people. This problem still persists till today as higher institutions in the continent only train students for white collar jobs instead of creating jobs using local resources. At the same time, African governments depend on ideas from developed countries, which are in most cases at

variance with Africa's ecological conditions. This initial mistake opened the way for importation of foreign ideologies – political, agricultural, technological, industrial, and security spheres. The “disconnect” from the roots is manifested in several sectors of African landscape (administrative, educational, political, economic, social, judicial, security, etc.). The problem of disconnect strengthens dependency syndrome, while African economy majors on export-oriented extractive industry – no production but consumption of imported goods.

Amankwah (1990) notes that development planning system in Ghana by its centralized nature has undermined the effectiveness of municipal governments in the country as decisions are imposed on cities' managers and rural council officials. The pattern is confirmed by Nigeria's experience. In spite of the considerable economic growth Nigeria experienced in the post-independent years (Lipton 1977:428), centralized development planning adopted by the country has made the majority of the people to be poor vis-à-vis income, education, health, employment, nutrition and access to basic facilities (Olatunbosun 1975; Etim and Etim 1976; Olowu and Akinola 1995:27-28). All development plans (First, Second, Third and Fourth Development Plans) and other development strategies in Nigeria have not alleviated poverty; rather, the situation has continued to worsen (Olowu and Akinola 1995:27-28).

In South Africa, the high unemployment and many poverty-stricken households which were a great concern on apartheid local government (LG) structures during the time of the 1994 democratic elections were not reduced about a decade later (Pillay et. al. 2006:2). In spite of several development strategies that were adopted and implemented – the Urban Development Strategy (UDS), the Rural Development Framework (RDF), the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) and the Local Economic Development Strategy (LED) – poverty did not abate in severity among the people (DLA 1997:22). For instance, the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) which emerged from the New Public Management and comparative experience in the US, the UK, New Zealand and the consequent LED strategy that was seen as a mechanism to develop local solutions, through partnerships, for the development of rural towns (RSA 1995b) has not yielded impressive results as poverty is on the increase (DBSA 2004:25). For example, records show that 2.4 million South Africans live in shacks and informal settlements across the country (Ikokwu 2007).

In the Bemba area of northeast Zambia, planners attempted to establish a town in the countryside to

offset the tendency of the Bemba people to migrate to the Copper-belt towns. The new town was equipped with electric power facilities, a secondary school and other attractions. But it did not succeed in achieving the planners' objective. The town of Jinja on Lake Victoria in Uganda is another example. A great deal of study is needed to identify the critical factors which are likely to enable or prevent urbanization in a given rural area before a commitment is made to establish a new development or trading town (Hunter 1969:268). One major problem that is associated with growth pole model is failure to generate spread effects. This problem is explained by Myrdal's Theory of Circular Causation. Myrdal maintains that economic development results in a circular causation process whereby the rich are awarded more favours and the efforts of those who lag behind are thwarted. The backwash effects predominate and the spread effects are dampened. This tends to lead to regional inequalities within the underdeveloped countries, and international inequalities as well. In underdeveloped countries, a circular and cumulative process, also known as the "vicious circle of poverty" operates and, being unregulated, causes increasing inequalities (Myrdal 1957, 1968).

Let me address this erroneous notion, as some might want us to believe that leadership problems are the bane of Africa's socio-economic and political crises. I disagree on this view in the sense that we have Africans across the globe who have excelled in their carriers and fields of discipline. If these people are able to distinguish themselves, it then means that Africans are not sub-humans. What the IAD scholars have discovered is that African problem is that of institutional crises that emanated from colonial connections and experiences. The colonial background with the consequence of 'disconnect from the roots' engendered a wide gap between African leaders and the rest of the African people. The problem of disconnect in African political economy is foundational. It goes without saying that "if the foundation is destroyed, what will the righteous do?" Once there is a dislocation between the head and the body all other organs automatically become dysfunctional and the whole body rendered maladjusted. This aptly illustrates African socio-economic and technological systems. What is actually wrong with African governance is a structural defect, which needs to be corrected through restructuring via polycentric development planning.

If, for instance, we can take two leaders in developed nations to govern two African countries, given the structure of governance in Africa, they will experience governance crises. It is also true on the other way around that if some African leaders are allowed to govern developed societies, they will

perform effectively simply because of the governance structures that exist over there. It is in this light that I argue that despite the amount of reforms carried out in Africa, without addressing the problem of disconnect, development at the grassroots and poverty reduction will continue to be a mirage. With the existing structure of governance in most African countries, it might be difficult for “angelic” individuals to effectively govern our societies. That is why the first thing to do in order to resolve African governance crisis is to get the right structure of governance that can reflect the wishes and aspirations of diverse peoples of Africa. In order to get the right structure of governance (self-governance) and reconstitute African socio-economic-political order, a clear understanding of the dynamic process that exists in diverse communities in Africa becomes imperative.

Despite the driving force of globalization and the positive responses of several regions in technological innovations, transforming the production and storage of food, the movement and trading in goods, employment generation and access to and consumption of goods, the converse is the case for Africa. The continent has become a dumping ground for imported machines, food and political ideology. In spite of the long history of universities in Africa and its abundant natural resources, the continent is still a little more than a non-starter, especially in food security, technological development, employment generation and conflict resolutions. With several potentials that are prerequisites for development, Africa is one of the poorest continents in the world that constantly relies on importation of daily needs that it could produce locally.

For instance, while innovative ideas are generated by African scholars in several disciplines, there have not been sufficient incentives on the part of African governments to harness these potentials. Rather, African governments, industrialists and to certain extent, the private sector patronized imported technology and development paradigm which are usually at variance with African realities. Consequently, these four key development players - African university, African government, African industry/private sector and farmers – operate on parallel lines as against collegial interactions within development arena. The high rate of unemployment among university graduates in Africa and heavy reliance on outside expertise by African governments suggest a continent divided against itself. Other factors that invariably account for development crises in Africa include: the inculcation of non-adaptive education; relegation of African mother tongues as modes of instruction in African educational systems and developmental process; importation of technology; stagnation of agricultural sector and dependency on minerals; high level of post-harvest

loss due to lack of storage devices; and reliance on nature for agricultural activities (Akinola 2007f:218).

According to Bases (2008), oil exporting nations (like Nigeria and Angola) in Sub-Saharan Africa pushed economic growth up 6.5 percent in 2008, but the global credit crisis and hike in food prices threaten the continent. This, invariably, raises economic and social challenges for the continent. Power is an acute problem. In the 48 countries in the region, generation capacity combined equals 63 gigawatts, about as much as Spain. When South Africa is removed from the equation, the capacity drops to 28 gigawatts, about as much as Argentina. In the same vein, The United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) warns that the global financial crisis, which is the worst since the 1930s, could deepen further, sinking most states in Africa, who rely on the export of agricultural commodities to boost their economic growth and feed their populations. At the same time, it would make it impossible for most states to access external funding for their own national development. To cap it all, loss in jobs especially in the industrialised nations of the West, invariably, will affect most Africans in the Diaspora. Consequently, money remitted by these Africans is also expected to decline massively (Africa News 2009).

The benefit of economic growth in Africa does not get to the grassroots. How do we explain the situation in Botswana, a country with large deposit of diamond but without a single industry to process the solid mineral? The mineral is exported to be processed abroad and then imported to the country for usage. This is slavery technology consumption. Invariably, growth is not benefiting the people as industries that process raw materials (which should generate employment) are not in Africa but in Europe and America. In essence, what we have in Africa is growth without development which invariably breeds exclusion as few people that share political power determine resources distribution that are usually skewed in favour of those in the corridor of power, while citizens are deprived and marginalised in all ramifications (Akinola, 2007f:234).

Economically, this position is reinforced by findings across Africa, especially, in Nigeria as well as in South Africa where economies are growing but of little to no benefit to the people as unemployment and poverty are increasing (Ibiam 2007; Monare 2007). The high rate of unemployment is self-embarrassing and disastrous for the continent. Statistics shows that South

Africa has a jobless rate of 32.4%, (NGO News Africa, June 9, 2010). The figure for Nigeria<sup>1</sup> is 19.7%, while the situation is worse in Namibia with 50% unemployment rate (NGO News Africa, June 2, 2010). High unemployment rates among Arab-educated graduates are disturbing: Morocco (26.8%), Algeria (19.3%) (Sawahel 2011) and Tunisia (30%) (UWN 2011; Saleh 2011). 94% of the unemployed in Egypt are in the age group 15-29 years (Sawahel 2011). This is in spite of an immense wealth in natural resources the continent is endowed with. A recent xenophobic – precipitated attack on immigrants as a result of unemployment in South Africa confirms Mutume’s (2006:7) prediction that the high level of unemployment among young men and women in Africa is a “ticking time bomb.” For instance, in May 2008, in South Africa, 56 people were killed, 650 injured and over 30,000 displaced or forced from their homes (*Businessday*, Wednesday May 28, 2008, p. 2).

In my own view, partnership arrangement in Africa differs from cultural background of the West where these ideas were copied. And it is important this issue is properly understood. The adoption and implementation of most Western ideas, especially decentralization, SAP, etc. do not get to the roots of African realities and hence could not solve the problems. Western ideas are elitist in orientation which contradicts African realities. According to the Director-General of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), Mr. Kandeh Yumkella, Nigeria is off the track in efforts to achieve the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) by 2015. Yumkella said:

...it was worrisome that even in 2008, the half way review of the MDGs, the review showed that Nigeria, like most other countries in Africa, was not on track...There are very strong institutional challenges in the country to meeting the MDGs ...Other regions are using their natural resources to create wealth and industrialization (Yumkella 2008 cited in Aliyu 2008).

It is the disappointment that the local people in Africa have met over the years that has made them to turn away from the African governments and invest their sense of sovereignty horizontally in each other, rather than vertically in government institutions. This is one of the reasons this paper pays great attention to direct and participatory democracies that the peoples of Africa practice on daily basis at community level through institutions they designed by themselves. The thinking is that, for policies in Africa to be people-oriented and problem-solving, critical attention should be

<sup>1</sup> Unemployment rate in Nigeria at 19.7 percent - 10 million Nigerians unemployed as at March, 2009. <http://www.ngex.com/news/public/newsinfo.php?nid=8925>. June 05, 2010. (Accessed June 7, 2010).

paid to these people-focused institutions.

The argument in this section is that the structurally-defective pattern of governance in Africa makes it difficult for the region to be governed even if the governors are sincere and adept in the act of governance. The possible way out of this crisis is to fashion out alternative governance structure that could enable the people and the public officials to engage themselves in self-governance community assembly (SGCA) as colleagues with equal standing and decide on what to do with locally available resources.

This paper demonstrates that the people of Africa are by no means less intellectually endowed than their counterparts in developed nations. This reinforces the notion that the socio-economic and political crises ravaging and pervading African continent are not consequent on the fact that the operators of African governments are black people. The problem is that of institutional dilemma. Under normal circumstances, government through its political actions should initiate development by throwing challenges on scholars, who should in turn, through knowledge generated, guide government by using the results of their applied and adaptive research. However, considering the domination of the polity by military and authoritarian civilian leaders in the last five decades, Africans could not work together as colleagues. Consequently, African state has faltered in several areas of development.

If we do not take deliberate decision, nothing will happen. Good governance and development are not easily come by except a lot of efforts are spent in bringing them to reality. Even angels will not bring development to our door step except human beings fulfil God's conditions of techno-political economy. If African scholars in this 21<sup>st</sup> Century are still being controlled by colonial intellectual syndrome, then development is forgone. Colonial intellectual legacy still prevails as attentions of scholars are directed towards foreign ideas. When opportunities exist to go abroad, scholars do not come back – brain drain. Alienation is one factor that affects African politicians and practitioners as well as African scholars as this makes them to be unrealistic in the way they conceptualize development. To them, it seems everything from developed nations has more value than what is associated with Africa.

The critical goals of the university are to teach, conduct research and consult with government and

non-governmental organizations in order to contribute effectively to national development. For instance, innovations capable of resolving the lingering problem of low agricultural yields and post-harvest losses have been produced by agricultural and food scientists and agricultural engineers in African universities. However because African governments and industrialists do not prioritize local technology, African peasant farmers have not been able to sufficiently benefit from these innovations (Akinola 2002:73). Some African universities insist that their scholars publish a percentage of their papers in foreign-based academic journals, books or reviews in order to be judged as having made a 'meaningful contribution' or to be considered for promotion. However little or no consideration is given, to the relevance of the publications to the scholars' immediate communities. Consequently, the incentive to publish 'abroad' is high. The result is a form of intellectual neo-colonialism, leading many African scholars to shift from local relevance to 'reigning' foreign ideologies. In the rush to publish abroad we continue to intellectually develop foreign economies, help generate employment for foreign publishers, and expand the tax base of their countries.

The point here is not to discourage foreign publications. The real issue is relevance; what is the relevance of research activities to the scholars' immediate communities. This is critical if African scholars are to rise to the multiple development challenges that surround them. Higher institutions should be sources of new ideas and innovation in all areas of life in Africa. Here are two proven strategies that work. In developed nations universities are ranked on their performance every year and it is this ranking that determines accessibility to research grants. These grants qualify as task specific funds and are distinguished from general funding which covers salaries and emolument and capital projects. Task specific funding is directed to scholars as an incentive to find practical solutions to specific problems. Second, the experience of developed nations in the aviation industry should be emulated. The Ansari Prize is a 10 million (USD) cash prize offered in a competition among the most talented entrepreneurs and rocket experts in the world. It, and more than 100 aviation incentive prizes offered between 1905 and 1935, are in great part responsible for the creation of today's multibillion dollar air transport industry.

One possible explanation for low government funding in higher education is the inability of African scholars to effectively prove their capabilities and potentials in turning things around on the continent. Unfortunately too many propagate foreign ideas hook, line and sinker. While they do justice in analyzing Africa's problems, they enter an intellectual 'cul-de-sac' (round about) when it

gets to finding solutions. The repeated suggestions found in the prized 'publications' offer little guidance: 'government should embark on reforms in X sector'; 'government should enact responsive policy to address the problem'; 'government should ensure that its policies have a human face'; 'government should provide the enabling environment'; 'leadership should ensure transparency and accountability to the citizenry', etc. The abc's on how concretely to address African problems are lacking (Akinola 2007f:222-223).

The socio-economic and political events in the region within the last three decades confirmed that the governance structure in Africa is grossly incapable of actualising the dreams and aspirations of the citizenry. The high rate of corruption, political violence, bloody electoral system and political assassinations confirmed that there are some fundamental problems entrenched in African polity. It is on record that Nigeria and other African countries lose over 40% of their annual budgets to corruption. Similarly, a 2002 World Bank report on corruption put the financial costs of corruption at 148 billion USD a year, which increases the costs of goods by as much as 20% (Fraser-Moleketi 2007:241). This corruption tends to insulate public officials from African realities and make them to live as foreigners within their continent. They are alienated from their fellow citizens in all ramifications.

The corruption factor provides possible explanation, for instance, to Ghanaian paradox of political stability alongside disastrous socio-economic indices. Ghana ranked 152 out of 189 countries in the latest Human Development Report (2010), poorer even than Yemen, the Sudan, Haiti and even violence torn Pakistan and the Congo (Tande 2010). In 2009, Ghana ranked 139 with 0.52 out of 178 countries, poorer than Gabon, 124<sup>th</sup> with 0.635; Morocco, 125<sup>th</sup> with 0.631; Namibia, 126<sup>th</sup> with 0.627; Sao Tome and Principe, 127<sup>th</sup> with 0.604; and Botswana 132<sup>rd</sup> with 0.565. Ghana has almost the same welfare conditions with war torn Republic of Congo (0.512) and Sudan (0.512) (Human Development Report 2009<sup>2</sup>). If Ghanaian stable democratic political system does not enhance the welfare of the citizens, what is the essence of democracy? The fact needs be stated here that democratic system with political stability that fails to deliver dividend of democracy in terms of

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<sup>2</sup> [http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco\\_hum\\_dev\\_ind-economy-human-development-index](http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_hum_dev_ind-economy-human-development-index) (Accessed 25/06/2009).

poverty reduction and enhancement of citizens' welfare is faced with a lot of queries. What could have accounted for this shortcoming in Ghanaian democracy? One possible explanation is corruption which is very rampant and has become a way of life especially to most government officials in African countries (see Akinola 2010g). As a matter of fact, the 2009 Global Corruption Report has revealed that political will to fight corruption in Ghana<sup>3</sup> had been the problem with governments, especially those affecting party faithfuls and financiers. Politicians and public officers collude with the private sector practitioners to enrich themselves. Like other African countries<sup>4</sup>, cases of embezzlement and low accountability of elected officials have been reported in Ghana (Aye 1999b; 2006:137). This confirms that free and fair elections and political stability may not contribute to welfare of citizens, hence, we should emphasise democratic system that can enable dividend of democracy to trickle down to the grassroots.

From the foregoing, African public officials (politicians and practitioners) have faltered in responding to the yearnings and aspirations of the citizenry, a situation that has constituted not only international embarrassment but also reduced African continent to appendage of developed nations only to beg for aid. African rulers delight much in international aid which arguably, goes to governments that have chased out their educated citizens and mismanaged their economies. Aid makes it possible for African rulers to buy off middle class people and integrate them into its patronage. Those outside of government capture aid by forming NGOs to do advocacy work. In Uganda, for instance, the fastest growing employer outside the state is NGOs (Mwenda 2007:A6). Currently aid is inefficient, uncoordinated and doesn't reach the target people. Large percentage of these monies are allegedly plundered and mismanaged by African public officials, while the local people are excluded from the good things of life. Meanwhile "technical assistance" accounts for one-fifth of all aid: a huge proportion of this is spent on high-priced consultants, chosen by donors and generally from donor countries. In Mozambique, for example, donors spend \$350 Million a year on 3,500 technical consultants, almost five times the total annual salaries of 100,000 Mozambican public-sector workers. In some countries, one day of a consultant's time costs as much as employing a teacher for a year or keeping 50 children in school (Walker 2008). The argument is

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<sup>3</sup> [http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/r\\_8415/](http://www.ghananewsagency.org/social/r_8415/) (Accessed 19/11/2009)

<sup>4</sup> Corruption in forms of embezzlement and low accountability of elected officials is rife in Nigeria (Akinola 2004:51-54), Kenya (Devas and Grant 2003:314), Senegal (Gellar 2005:x) and Uganda (Makara 2000; Devas and Grant 2003; Golooba-Mutebi 2004; Wunsch and Ottemoeller 2004).

that aid alone is not enough for development, but it is needed. Until the political question of who should shape development is addressed, the problems of poverty and inequality cannot be solved. Aid and its conditionality in Africa only confirms that though many African countries have gained their political independence, in reality and in most cases they are still trapped in an asymmetrical economic, power and knowledge relationship with the former colonial powers that continue to dominate the process of globalisation and the institutions of global governance (the IMF, the World Bank, the WTO, etc). The role of knowledge in economic development has not been accorded its rightful position in Africa, hence, the high reliance of African governments on expatriates who are not relevant to African needs.

In the face of high unemployment among university graduates in Africa, Ndoye (2005) has raised a fundamental question: Is the quality and relevance of education flawed – while Africa relies heavily on outside expertise? The argument is that: if African scholars are of low quality, then there is no possibility of being relevant to the outside world. This is because evidence abound that they are able to compete with their counterparts elsewhere, hence, the continuous migration of these scholars to the North (see Zeleza 2005:209; World Bank 2005). East Asia has reduced the rate of brain drain by creating the right policy and institutional incentives for their skilled citizens to stay at home. Further, the World Bank's study showed that only less than five per cent of the skilled nationals of countries like India, Brazil, China and Indonesia live abroad (World Bank 2005 cited in Mwenda 2007:A6). Contrary is the case in Africa.

For instance, China has emerged as the world's second-largest economy behind the United States by passing Japan, Germany, France and Great Britain (New York Times 2010). Though China, a developing country, has roughly the same land mass as the United States and it is burdened with a fifth of the world's population and insufficient resources, it has restructured its economy by looking inward to utilise the skills of her citizens. If China could achieve this level of economic self-reliance, Africa with its enormous resources and skilled workers can do the same, if not more.

One of the major problems in this direction is that the attitudes and actions of some African leaders are hostile to intellectual development. In an attempt to demobilize democratic forces that oppose their authoritarianism, these African leaders chased away the most educated citizens. Consequently, they succeeded in chasing away the most important resource (intellectualism) for the economic

advancement of their nations. Examples of such cases are found in most African countries.

This section will not be complete without discussing international conspiracy of international organizations in their policy agenda in Africa.

### **International Conspiracy against Development in Africa**

International organizations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conspired against Africa in several areas – subsidy and policy on trade liberalization to weaken African capabilities in food security and employment generation. The conspiracy stems from the imbalance in the world capitalist development clearly explained by the dependency and/or conspiracy theory (Furtado 1964; Sunkel 1969; Emmanuel 1972; Amin 1972; Rodney 1976; Frank 1979).

Almost all the countries of the sub-Saharan Africa have had to institute programmes of economic reconstruction – Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP) – to remove what are perceived to be the causes of economic crisis. The programmes focused strictly on economic aspects without consideration of other important factors – socio-cultural and political conditions. That was why Sawyerr (1990) faulted the credibility of SAP in Africa on the ground that the programmes contained no viable strategy for industrialisation on the basis of full development and use of local raw materials and skills. The period of SAP in most African countries witnessed mass training and retraining of public officials to re-condition their minds to the tenets of SAP bearing little or no fruits at the grassroots level (Mbaya 1995). Invariably, SAP has deepened economic crisis which in turn precipitated declining social welfare and increased human misery simply because the programmes contained no viable strategy that could motivate and mobilise the peoples of Africa in diverse cultural and ecological settings around economic projects (Ali 1990; Khalid 1986; Sawyerr 1990).

In response to accusations leveled against the Bretton Woods Institutions, the poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) was evolved. Two principles of international development are brought together in the PRSP approach: the promotion of democracy and the eradication of poverty. It is believed that improved representation of formerly excluded people in local government administration would give the poor better access to local public services and thereby reducing

vulnerability and insecurity (Jutting et. al. 2004). The underlining principle of PRSPs is the need for recipient countries to own their development strategies through ownership of the policy agenda and partnership with all stakeholders (Ikhide 2006:64). However, the culture and language of PRSPs that are rooted in foreign initiatives are too abstract for African people to understand. Besides, the three categories of the poor – transitional, marginal and residual – that are peculiar to African continent were not properly accounted for by the PRSPs. Consequently, most socio-economic and political decisions in Africa did not reflect the wishes and aspirations of the poor simply because of the persistent and widening gap between the “governors” (the rich) and the governed (the poor) (Akinola 2009b).

Using the IAD framework, analysis shows that repressive institutional order fueled by the capitalist ideologies prioritizes profit for the few at the expense of the majority. The neo-liberal capitalist ideologies are subscribed to by the governments of the advanced countries. For instance, the present food crisis with increasing prices pays the big business and big capitalist farmers in the advanced countries and the producing countries because it aids profiteering at the detriment of the consuming population. Big farmers and big food-related firms tend to employ small fraction of agricultural farmers, mostly casual workers for maximum profit. Similarly, the poor farmers are excluded from the huge subsidies going to agriculture as the subsidies are given to the big farmers (see detailed analysis as done by Oxfam 2006).

While subsidies are given to farmers in advanced economies, the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) and World Bank have insisted on the termination of subsidies to local farmers in developing countries, especially in Africa. This has been described as double standard on the part of the Bretton Wood institutions. The consequence of differential and biased subsidy on the international arena is that big farmers and firms produced in large quantity at reduced prices and thereby gained upper hands in free markets. This argument is supported by Beaubien. According to Beaubien (2006), bags of U.S. cornmeal are stacked in a U.N. World Food Programme warehouse in Blantyre, Malawi. While it is true that food is desperately needed in Africa the annual shipment of millions of tons of food aid to Africa by the United States have the tendency to stifle agricultural development in the continent.

*...cheap, subsidized powdered milk from Europe has flooded West African markets. If you go through the countryside in Senegal or Mali, you won't be able to find local milk... because the powdered milk has destroyed the whole dairy sector in West Africa...the agricultural policies of the*

*world's richest nations are choking economic development in some of the poorest countries on the globe* (Beaubien 2006).

Further is the role of international financing institutions in crippling African educational sector. Since education is the backbone of development, non-adaptive education means lack of development. The educational foundation that was laid by colonial administrations made little or no effort to respond to national economic needs and local demand, and it has survived colonialism. By and large, the curriculum in African schools does not give enough and sufficient attention to the study of African governance structures, endogenous impulses or the capabilities of diverse peoples of Africa. The policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions maintained that Africa did not need universities and that African students could be trained abroad (Europe and America) (see for details, Onyeonuru 2004:198; Awopetu 1998; Olukoshi 1998:33). Accordingly, African governments were forced to cut funding on higher education. According to Assié-Lumumba (2006:60), governments' investment in higher education in Africa is on the decline as expenditure per student in higher education as a percent of Gross National Investment (GNI) per capita has drastically fallen from 1490.8 percent in 1965, to 820.8 percent in 1980, to just 107.2 percent in 1997. Less funding of higher education in Africa invariably means that Africans have to migrate to the North (in Europe and America) to acquire higher education, thus indicating colonial intellectual syndrome. This has more or less made African scholars intellectually dependent as they propagate foreign development paradigm hook, line and sinker. As expected, this results into technically dependent syndrome. The strategic implications of the World Bank's thinking are succinctly captured by Shadrack Gutto:

*It was meant to reduce – and succeeded in reducing – Africa and Africans to the level of mere purchasers, peddlers and uncritical consumers of knowledge about Africa and Africans developed by the North to serve the interests and the needs of the North. It also created space for the deployment in Africa of so called experts, consultants and advisors from the North, at considerable cost to the continent* (Gutto 2006:310).

In reaction to sharp criticisms from both the rich and poor countries, the IMF launched a new programme, called a Policy Support Instrument (PSI) in 2005, as a 'non-financial mechanism.' It does not give a direct financing; rather interested countries get IMF advice, monitoring and approval. It, thus, makes it easier and cheaper for such countries to borrow on international money markets. However, if a PSI country fails to attain IMF certification, the country is cut off. Consequently, other lending agencies generally do the same. This new 'gatekeeper' function of the IMF makes it commands and immense power over developing countries that sign PSIs. At present,

African countries that have signed on to the instrument include: Mozambique, Cape Verde, Nigeria, Tanzania, Senegal and Uganda (Mutume 2008).

The foregoing discussions only confirm that the IMF has developed octopus power over Africa as the PSI represents a graduated denigration of Africa over the SAP of the 1980s. The problems SAP created within the last two decades in Africa are enormous. For instance, SAP forced African governments to cut public spending for education and health care, privatised state owned enterprises and opened markets to foreign goods. Consequently, both education and health facilities are in shambles. The few bourgeoisies at the corridor of power bought over all public enterprises while the masses, invariably, became the private 'estate' of these bourgeoisies. Similarly, trade liberalization had destroyed African young industries and thus subjected the continent to the appendage of developed economies. As expected, the impoverished peripheral African economy continues to feather the interests of the core advanced economies.

### **Economic Development Potentials in Africa**

According to Mutharika<sup>5</sup> (2007), Africa is not a poor continent. Rather it is the people who are. The continent has the largest world deposits of diamonds, gold, coal, copper and manganese. It has large deposits of minerals, huge reserves of crude oil and natural gas and vast forests, fisheries and land for agriculture and cattle ranching. However, the people in the continent rank among the poorest in the world in the midst of plenty. Three major reasons account for this. First, since the early days of colonialism, there has been incessant plunder and exploitation of Africa's resources by the developed world to the detriment of economic development in Africa. Second, there is deliberate marginalisation of Africa in global financing, foreign direct investment and access to science and technological innovation that could have created new wealth for Africa. In other words, African resources do not create new wealth or employment in Africa because they are not processed on the continent but are shipped to the industrialised countries in raw form. Third, most African governments have, so far, not taken concrete action to ensure that globalisation system is changed in the favour of Africa (Mutharika 2007).

In order to achieve mutually productive ways of life for the diverse peoples of Africa, pragmatic strategies, that are capable of addressing the problems of internal disconnects and international

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<sup>5</sup> Bingu Wa Mutharika is President of the Republic of Malawi

conspiracy plaguing African continent, are highly imperative. Given the abundant resources and potentials in Africa, NEPAD<sup>6</sup> for example, is in a vintage position to adopt innovative strategies and programmes to harness African resources and potentials towards self-reliant development. The state of permanent economic crises which seemed to defy all the solutions that were applied requires alternative strategies that are Africentred, people-oriented and solution-seeking.

Ideally, political leaders and scholars should work together when there is a problem to resolve rather than apportion blame when things go wrong. As an incurable optimist in problem-solving and solution-seeking scholarship as antidote of African governance and developmental crises, I have not only developed African development models that are problem-solving but have also designed institutional mechanism for the application of not less than twenty one (21) African development models that are pragmatic in several sectors of African economy. The models are designed to harness economic development potentials in Africa. The position of this paper, therefore, is that such home-grown models would need to be applied on pilot scale so that findings and experiences gathered from these pilot cases would help in refining and modifying the models for full replication across the continent. The impact of the application of these models would not only reduce poverty but findings and experiences gathered from these exercises would also, invariably, be useful to reform African educational curriculum.

Some of the economic development potentials in Africa are discussed below.

**Tree and Food Crops Potentials:** Benue State in the middle belt of Nigeria is synonymous with food production, and is called “The Food Basket of the Nation”. Notable agricultural products include: yam, cassava, maize, soya – beans, ground nut, beniseed, citrus trees and palm trees. Similarly, Oke-Ogun area of Oyo State, Nigeria also exhibits the same features, which earned the area, the title, “The Food Basket of Oyo State.” According to Oni (2002:20), to cultivate a 50 hectare plantation of pineapple, investors will need ₦1.1 million per annum. A minimum of 1,200,000 fruits will be picked annually and at conservative price of ₦25 per fruit, a minimum of ₦30 million will be realized. In this respect, Amuye Faforiji in Atakumosa East Local Government Area, Osun State has been noted for the cultivation of different types of fruits that could be processed into concentrates for export to other companies producing fruit drinks (see Akinola 2002:74; 2005b). For example, some 300 plantain suckers were planted by the author using poultry

<sup>6</sup> NEPAD’s mandate resonates around increasing prosperity and eradicating poverty through job creation.

wastes as organic fertilizer in August 2007. The amazing result is that the land has been rejuvenated with bountiful harvest. These types of food potentials exist in several countries across Africa.

**Livestock, Fisheries and Rabbitry Potentials:** Environmental resources such as green vegetation and water bodies that can support livestock and fisheries are abundant across Africa. Unfortunately, many of these potentials remain largely untapped, while we continue to import protein from other countries. For example, Professor Martins Anetekhah at the Lagos State University, Nigeria teaches and practicalizes fishery and thereby turns knowledge to wealth. He took a loan of ₦0.2 Million in 2002, invested it in fish farm which as at 2007 worth ₦30 Million (*The Punch*, Tuesday, October 23, 2007, p. 47). Another example was a personal experiment that I carried out between October, 2005 and February, 2006 which shows that three rabbits (2 female, 1 male) multiplied to 22 rabbits within three months. By projection, using simple arithmetic (for four generations), the number would be 380 within a year – October, 2005 to October, 2006 (Akinola 2006b).

### **Innovation potentials and knowledge generation**

Penning de Vries (2005) link the emergence of ‘bright spots’<sup>7</sup> or community success to a number of conditions and the presence of certain drivers. While some of the conditions are incentives accruable to participants, drivers can come in the form of strong individuals, new community organizations, innovative technologies and practices or external agents. The introduction of innovations by researchers to farmers and the consequent success of the efforts in Ng’uuru Gakirwe in Tharaka<sup>8</sup> district, Kenya attracted many farmers who later benefitted from the programmes. The innovations included irrigation scheme, processing, packaging and export of products abroad. The Ng’uuru Gakirwe irrigation scheme in Tharaka was able to expand from 135 farmers in 1988 to

<sup>7</sup> Bright Spots are small communities or households that have improved their livelihoods and natural resources significantly despite having degraded biophysical and socio-economic conditions around them.

<sup>8</sup> Tharaka district is classified as arid and semiarid lands that can only accommodate dry land crops such as millet, sorghum and cowpea, and livestock keeping. In most cases, these crops suffer recurrent moisture stress, leading to crop failure due to poor rainfall distribution. Thus, about 60 percent of the population in the area live below the poverty line (Republic of Kenya 2004). The Ng’uuru Gakirwe Water Project therefore started out with poor disadvantaged members. The scheme covers an area of 60 km, accommodating a total of 430 farmers and has its own processing and packaging factory. The farmers have formed a company, Meru Herbs, which handles the factory as well as marketing of chamomile, carcade and lemongrass. These three herbs are grown organically and sold to the factory for processing, packaging and export to the EU (mostly Italy, Belgium and Germany). Training is an important component of the project as farmers come from a background of rain-fed cereal crops with little experience in irrigation or exotic herbs. In addition, farmers grow fruits like mango, banana and papaya which are also sold to Meru Herbs for making of various types of additive-free jams exported to the EU and Japan. Meru Herbs Company is the commercial arm of the Ng’uuru Gakirwe Water Project and is located in the project area.

over 430 farmers in 2000 simply because research efforts and training of local farmers changed an important exogenous variable (arid condition) through irrigation and new techniques that constituted favourable factors (processing and packaging). The farmers specialized in the production of high-value organic herbs, fruits and vegetables, accompanied by processing, packaging and sale in niche and export markets abroad. Average incomes of farmers rose from almost zero to over \$300 per farmer per month (Penning de Vries 2005:87).

Similarly, the Lare<sup>9</sup> Water Harvesting Project, designed for water harvesting from roads into earthen pans for supplemental irrigation in Nakuru, Kenya, represents an effective innovation that was quickly adopted by farmers. Various harvesting methods (roof water harvesting and runoff water harvesting, etc.) designed by researchers and extension services were transferred to local people who in turn designed and constructed the pans themselves. They designed new pans in order to store and treat harvested water for both irrigation and domestic purposes. The pace of adoption of the innovations within the area is another important factor. Starting with about 400 pans in 1998, there were about 2,000 pans in 2004, a fivefold increase in just 6 years. Although the physical conditions may have suited the innovation well, other factors also affect it; these are, for example, technology transfer from researchers, extension services and access to markets. In 1998 there were approximately 409 households that adopted the systems; by the end of 1999 the number increased to 1,030. That represents a 150 percent increase in one year. By August 2004, over 4,000 households had water harvesting systems, indicating a tenfold increase in just 6 years. Apart from farm family incomes that have increased from a negligible amount to about \$2,000 to \$6,000 per year, food security and household health has been improved due to better nutrition and clean drinking water which is treated for suspended sediments, boiled and filtered so that it is clean (Penning de Vries 2005:93).

Examples of creative innovations from Africa that can be replicated to enhance development abound:

- Investigations carried out by the Department of Agricultural Engineering, Obafemi Awolowo

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<sup>9</sup> Lare, a semi-arid area, before the project had about 70 percent of all households experienced serious water-shortage problems. The Lare Water Harvesting Project has been a showcase of how rainwater harvesting can transform livelihoods within a relatively short time. In a project that spanned 2 years between 1998 and 1999, farmers were trained in roof water harvesting, runoff water harvesting and simple water treatment methods.

University, Ile-Ife, Nigeria demonstrated a saving of 20 work-days when farmers used mechanical methods designed by agricultural engineers, instead of the traditional methods (Akinola 2002:73);

- The Department of Food Science and Technology of this same Nigerian university, using physical principles, has developed effective and viable methods of food preservation (see Taiwo et. al. 1997; Enujiugha. et. al. 2002; Akanbi et. al. 2006).
- The Songhai Centre in Porto Novo, Republic of Benin is renown for training in entrepreneurship opportunities in agribusiness, ranging from animal feed/feed processing, fish farming, mushroom farming, rearing, snail farming, dry season vegetable production, bio-gas production to piggery (Adebisi 2006:29).
- Scholars in the Department of microbiology in Obafemi Awolowo University had invented techniques using decomposed wastes to generate energy. In particular, Prof. Odeyemi has been using energy generated for cooking and lightning in his home for several years (see Odeyemi, 1979, 1982; Odeyemi, et. al. 1991).
- Jelani Aliyu<sup>10</sup>, has designed a state-of-the-art electronic car. The car is described as an advanced technology extended range electric passenger model. It was regarded as an “American Revolution and the hottest concept in decision line.” The Nigerian automobile engineer was among eight designers that engaged in tough competition within two months. While seven of the eight of the model concepts reviewed were eliminated, Aliyu’s model was selected for development (Anya 2007:2).
- Scholars in the Department of civil engineering in Obafemi Awolowo University had designed machine that converts palm kernel wastes to activated carbon for water treatment to de-colourise, and de-odourise water as well as remove taste, chlorine and heavy metals such as lead, cromium, cadmium and arsenic that are carcinogenic. This machine can be used for industrial water treatment and liquid refining (Ogedengbe et. al. 1985; Adewumi et. al. 2005). At present, Engineer Adewumi has developed batch processing furnace capable of assisting rural women and youth who work in palm oil processing in activated carbon production to enhance their income and social status.
- Scholars in the Department of Mechanical Engineering in University of Lagos, Nigeria had

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<sup>10</sup> Aliyu had his primary and secondary schools education as well as part of his university education in Nigeria before he got a scholarship to study Automobile Design in the US.

designed a pyrolysis reactor for the treatment of municipal solid waste and for resource recovery. The machine has the potential to achieve a waste volume reduction of about 65% (Ojolo and Bamgboye 2005). Similarly, a prototype machine was developed to crack roasted cashew nuts. This replaces the traditional method, which is labour-intensive, slow and tedious. The percentage of whole kernels produced was between 66.0% and 70% with shelling efficiency of 95%. A device of this nature can be manufactured for small entrepreneurs and village-level applications in the developing countries where bulk of the world cashew is produced (Ojolo and Ogunsina 2007; Ojolo et. al. 2009). Adopting the principle of 'turning waste to wealth', some scholars in University of Lagos used palm kernel shells as raw materials in a laboratory scale downdraft biomass gasifier, designed to deliver a mechanical power of 4kW and thermal power of about 15kW (Ojolo and Orisaleye 2010).

It is important to note that people are also transforming indigenous knowledge inherited from parents to confront present day realities. In Saki, Oke-Ogun area of Nigeria, people in intermediate-technology institutions (notably in the fabrication of aluminium cooking utensils), blacksmiths and iron-smelters, iron-benders and welders, fabrication and designers associations inherited their skills from their grandparents. Associations of skilled workers involved in the iron industry assist one another financially, physically and transmit acquired knowledge and craft technology to new community members (Akinola 2007f:229).

In the particular case of Nigeria, there has been virtually no attempt by government to establish small scale industries where adapted technological skills can be used in agriculture to increase food production. As a result, produce, notably yam flour *elubo gari*, beans, maize, tobacco and citrus fruits perish during the harvest season because there is no system of preservation. Yet there are many community-based institutions that have adopted an intermediate agro-allied and spare-parts manufacturing strategy.

This is just a small sampling of innovations that can, but are not, benefiting more African farmers. The goal is to empower these innovators so that their potentials and skills can be harnessed towards economic development in the continent. Whereas, food security and poverty reduction require the widespread and continuous invention and adoption of new technology in the form of both new methods of production (process innovation) and new products (product innovations), vast resources

and energies of farmers are wasted perennially due to non-availability of appropriate technologies for food processing and storage.

### **Specific Ecological Agriculture Interventions in Africa**

Data from the Tigray project in the Tigray region in Ethiopia between 2002 and 2004 showed that, on average, composted fields gave higher yields, sometimes double, than those treated with chemical fertilisers (Araya and Edwards 2006). Other specific examples summarised by Hine and Pretty (2008), Parrott and Marsden (2002), Pretty and Hine (2001), and Scialabba and Hattam (2002) are listed:

1. Soil and water conservation in the drylands of Burkina Faso and Niger have transformed formerly degraded lands. The average family has shifted from being in cereal deficit of 644 kg per year (equivalent to 6.5 months of food shortage) to producing an annual surplus of 153 kg.
2. In Tigray, Ethiopia, yields of crops from composted plots were three to five times higher than those treated only with chemicals. Some 12,500 households in Ethiopia have adopted sustainable agriculture, resulting in a 60% increase in crop yields.
3. Projects in Senegal promoted stall-fed livestock, composting systems, green manures, water harvesting systems and rock phosphate. Yields of millet and peanuts increased dramatically by 75% to 195% and 75% to 165% respectively.
4. In Kenya, 500 farmers on some 1,000 hectares have seen maize yields improve from about 2 to 4 tonnes per hectare (t/ha) following the application of soil conservation, soil fertility and organic agriculture methods. Similarly, a range of biological pest management methods together with legumes, cover crops and green manures for soil fertility improvement resulted in a doubling of beans and groundnut yields from 300 to 600 kilograms per hectare (kg/ha) in Western Kenya.
5. In Eastern and Central Kenya, smallholder farmers have been trained in natural soil fertility management; integrated environmentally friendly weed, pest and disease protection; on-farm soil and water conservation techniques; and farm level seed conservation, with a resulting 50% increase in productivity and 40% increase in income. More than 1,000 farmers in low soil fertility areas in the north rift and western regions of Kenya increased maize yields to 3,414 kg/ha (a 71% increase in productivity) and bean yields to 258 kg/ha (a 158% increase in productivity) as compared to traditional agriculture, by incorporating soil fertility management, crop diversification and improved crop management.

6. The integration of pond fish culture into low-input farm systems with some 2,000 farmers in Malawi increased vegetable yields from 2,700 to 4,000 kg/ha, with the fish ponds producing the equivalent of 1,500 kg/ha of fish and proving a new source of food for households.

The projects here were those embarked upon, as experiments, by FAO and other international organizations. African governments are highly apathetic and non-responsive to the adoption of these innovations due to some factors. Hence, the long years of operations of these organizations have not yielded expected results. How do we ensure that African governments adopt these innovative ideas for their people?

### **Wind Energy Potentials and Innovation**

Wind is abundant, low cost, and widely distributed. It is available for all countries to tap for energy. This realization has prompted William Kamkwamba, from Malawi, a born inventor. When he was 14, he built an electricity-producing windmill from spare parts and scrap, working from rough plans he found in a library book called *Using Energy* and modifying them to fit his needs. The windmill he built powers four lights and two radios in his family home (Africa Focus 2009b). African governments and universities have a great lesson to learn here. Some 70 countries across the globe are now harnessing wind resources for electric generation. From 2000 to 2008, data shows that generating capacity from wind resources increased from 17,000 megawatts to an estimated 121,000 megawatts. Denmark is the leader, at 21% but planning to push the wind share of its electricity to 50%. For Germany as a whole, the figure is 8%. Other countries that are benefiting from wind energy include: Spain (17,000 megawatts), China (12,000 megawatts), United States (over 28,000 megawatts), etc. (Africa Focus 2009a). In spite of these breakthroughs in wind energy, Africa is lagging behind in this breakthrough and revolution.

### **Community Institutions and Development in Africa**

Having been disappointed by the state, people of Africa have invested their sovereignty horizontally in one another through collective action and self-organizing capabilities to address problems of daily existence. While these people-oriented institutions otherwise called community development associations, community-based institutions/organisations vary in their attributes, the common denominator is their capacity to mobilize people and their potential to increase material resources for community projects. These institutions function as non-partisan umbrellas for rallying community members together to address community problems. Some functions that they

perform include: (a) infrastructural development of the village or community; (b) settlement of individual and inter-village disputes; (c) promotion of community relations; (d) maintenance of socio-cultural functions; and (e) overall local governance of the community, including making and execution of policies and laws.

Indications from Nigeria, Ghana, Chad and Uganda show that community-based organizations function as de facto units of local government (Olowu and Wunsch 2004:11). It is important to note that the economic, social and political impact of these institutions are being rediscovered, especially in developing countries (Narayan et al. 2001). There is evidence that civil society – occupational, community-based, and religious organizations – exist in localities throughout Africa, and in some circumstances can be an important participant in service delivery and in enforcing accountability (Barkan 1994; Dia 1996; Olowu 1999; Ribot 2000; Akinola, 2000, 2003, 2004).

Community institutions in Africa possess self-organizing capabilities through which community members relate to one another in a rule-ordered relationship, sharing ideas, and using their own initiatives and institutional potentials to address problems of daily existence. Examples of local people's provision and production of public goods using available social capital (associations) are well documented throughout African continent (Olowu, Ayo and Akande 1991; Bratton 1989, 1990, 1994; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Olowu and Erero, 1997; Adedeji 1997; Coulibally 1999; Adedeji and Ayo 2000; Ayo 2002; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; Sawyer 2005; Akinola 2000, 2003a, 2004, 2005d, 2007a,f, 2008b, 2009a,b, 2010a,b). The existence of these community-based institutions confirm that the people, too govern; not the state alone. If indeed the people govern, then government governs in a limited sense. However, Olowu and Wunsch (2004:248) note that though these community institutions and social capital exist in many African countries, few succeed in connecting them to the local government system. These structures should form the basis upon which African scholars engage in intellectual entrepreneurial endeavours. From this point, African scholars can begin to search how to work with people at the grassroots levels to achieve productive and liberating civilization in the continent.

### **Results of an Experiment**

As an advocacy and a development planner, my research interests have centred on adaptive education, effective governance know-how and institutional mechanisms that are capable of re-

orientating African governments to overcome the problems of underdevelopment and poverty. This in turn inspired the establishment of the Irepodun Investment Cooperation (IIC) in Osun State, Nigeria. The Irepodun Investment Cooperation (IIC) in Osun State, Nigeria involved 16 associations working in conjunction with the local government council. The language of the programme is the mother tongue of the people – Yoruba. Irepodun Investment Cooperation was designed to be an inward-looking vehicle aimed at harnessing and utilizing local resources to generate employment for local youths. It was a joint venture between all interested indigenes of the local government (at home and abroad) as well as any interested person residing in the community and the local government council. Actual ownership in the investment is based on the ability of individuals and organizations to purchase shares of the company with cash, crop-Naira<sup>11</sup>, time-Naira and innovation-Naira. Farmers and local people can purchase shares through crop-Naira, while casual workers can purchase shares through time-Naira. Academics that are able to generate innovations in any areas of local industrial development can buy shares through innovation-Naira. All workers in the local industries and factories are expected to purchase shares and be part of owners. This is essential because tendency for strong commitment to the survival of local industry is higher when workers are part of owners of local industry since the workers know that if the industry fails, they lose their shares and investment. Invariably, wealth is created when opportunities are opened to local citizens to be joint owners of local industries. At the same time, local industries would provide job opportunities for the youths. In such circumstance, local industries and enterprises would enable the transitional poor to move out of poverty as it opens opportunities not only to be co-owners of local investments but also to become employees in local industries and factories. In the long run, local economic development would reduce rural-urban drift (Akinola 2005b,d,e; 2006b,g; 2007f).

The board of managers for IIC was elected in December 2005 and the leaders of company have completed the drafting of its constitution and the next step is registration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Afterwards the sale of shares to the public and to the local government would commence. However, the local government council has failed to follow through in its role as

<sup>11</sup> Naira is Nigerian currency as we have Rand for South Africa and Cedi for Ghana. Crop-Naira is a concept that translates farmers' crops to monetary equivalent (Naira in Nigeria's context) for the purpose of purchasing shares in local industry. For instance, if a farmer harvests 15 tons of maize he may decide to sell 10 tons to a local industry, while he keeps 2 tons for his household. He may decide to use the remaining 3 tons to purchase shares in the local industry. Meaning that he will be paid the monetary value of 10 tons, while shares certificate that worths 3 tons of maize will be issued to him by the local industry. The same applies to workers in the local factory. They may use part of their salaries to purchase shares.

facilitator. This has significantly hampered progress of the project. Yet the Osun State Government, impressed by the potential of Irepodun Investment Cooperation model, launched a similar strategy for economic self-reliance, food security, employment generation and poverty reduction. Amazingly, rather than consult and collaborate with the local initiative, the government opted to visit and study a similar program in China! (Akinola 2007f:230). A way of replicating this strategy is for African universities to design a well structured programme on Entrepreneurial Development Studies (EDS) as done in Covenant University in Ota near Lagos, Nigeria.

For example, much of socio-economic development in Germany is attributed to the development path undertaken by the country's universities:

*The German Democratic Republic has become one of the leading industrial nations in the world. Its success is due, in no small part, to its ability to produce a large, highly trained technical elite through a sophisticated education system closely tailored to the needs of the society (Giles 1978).*

It has been found that “socialization” of the university (relating their work more closely to the requirements of the state) or the doctrine of social adaptation of university education is a pre-condition for the technological survival of nations. No modern university can exist in isolation from the society on which it thrives (Aderinto 1985). Given this caveat, the impact of any university must be measured by its ability to improve the well-being of the society and offer practical solutions to intractable problems of development.

Unfortunately, African universities and governments have, so far, not taken concrete action to ensure that African resources are harnessed and globalisation system is changed in the favour of Africa. Bingu Wa Mutharika<sup>12</sup> corroborates this when he argues that:

*Africans have not developed home grown strategies to deal with the continent's specific situations. In most cases, the continent depended on “surrogate economists” for advice and ended up with wrong diagnoses, wrong prescriptions and hence wrong results (Mutharika 2007).*

Further, Bingu Wa Mutharika suggests that:

*Africans must agree on economic strategies and technological innovations that are tailored to respond to the challenges of poverty alleviation and help to bridge the “technology divide” between industrialised and developing nations (Mutharika 2007).*

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<sup>12</sup> Bingu Wa Mutharika is President of the Republic of Malawi.

The current global economic-financial crisis, more than ever, requires urgent intervention of scholars in various disciplines to engage in problem-solving scholarship. In this era of problem-solving knowledge regime, the onus rests on African scholars to think in a new way i.e. add value to their disciplines or fields to solve specific problems in Africa.

Using appropriate institutional mechanism, African scholars' capacities in various fields should be identified for further innovation and invention. Without intellectual breakthrough, there is no societal development simply because intellectual capacity is the foundation of development. Good critiques with concrete recommendations on specific problems are needed. By now, we should be tired of myopic and shallow suggestions/recommendations. What we need is the ABC of how to address specific problems that are confronting African continent. This is where the role of African scholars becomes indispensable. This brings the discussions on the challenge that African scholars face in order to enable the continent experience a passage to mutually productive ways of life.

### **The Challenge on African Scholars**

Given the peculiar conditions of African leaders, speaking the 'truth' to the power by African scholars is not sufficient but a necessary condition to resolve the complex and hydra-headed problems in the continent. What is required is that African scholars should go the extra mile in applying knowledge to the recurrent challenges – taking theories to the streets. In my own view, the challenges in Africa constitute an acid test of Africans capability in resolving the challenges facing the continent. The question is: How capable are Africans to resolve their internal crisis without recourse to external assistance? While some African leaders do not know what they are doing innocently, others are ignorantly ignorant of their ignorance. On the other hand, some African leaders are despotic and authoritarian; and they have nothing to offer their people. They are highly apathetic to changes but only to maintain the status quo. In view of the apathy of African leaders to effectively govern their communities, the only hope of the continent is for African scholars to rise to the challenge and ignite necessary changes the continent needs. How will they do these?

This section sheds some light on the role of African scholars on how they can demonstrate their intellectual capability in resolving the crisis in the continent. Ideally, political leaders and scholars should work together when there is a problem to resolve rather than apportion blame when things have gone wrong. In my own view, there are two options. While in some instances both scholars

and governments should work together, in other cases scholars should also be concerned with how to take theories to the streets to proof and test their knowledge. It is not enough to critique the governmental system without offering an alternative workable strategy of how to solve the problems at hand. As the late Michael Manley said:

*Those who have to face the challenge of action may make mistakes. Meantime, those who reside permanently in the world of ideas, alone and untested, do not help anyone when they refuse that reality is more complex than theory* (Michael Manley cited in Kari Levitt 2005:302).

In essence, African leaders and African scholars as well as governments and universities should find a mix of their operations so that their threats can be converted to opportunities. However, since it seems that African governments are not interested in harnessing African knowledge, potentials and skills towards socioeconomic and political development of the continent. It is the contention of this paper that African scholars should be prepared to go the extra mile in taking theories to the streets and fashion out the possible way forward for the continent. The critical questions are: Should African scholars continue to generate knowledge for knowledge generation sake and fold their hands on application of knowledge? For how long are they going to maintain this intellectual aloofness? This paper calls the attention of African scholars to this urgent assignment of making their scholarship problem-solving, solution-seeking and relevant to their community. This paper argues that it is possible for Africans to use their entrepreneurships and work together as colleagues with equal standing within development arenas to redeem the continent from the clutch of Western hegemony and liberate the people from poverty and oppression.

African scholars should use their intellectual capacity to further the interests of their people, and to help create a living socio-economic, political, cultural and liberating environment. African intellectuals should critically study indigenous and endogenous impulses that diverse peoples of Africa are exploiting in surmounting their daily challenges. This means that Africa scholars and other scholars in Africa need to rethink their analytical tools, jettison failed models of development, and discreetly focus on those that can yield enduring socio-economic and political liberation for Africans. The fundamental questions include the following: How are the people surviving regarding basic needs like food, housing, clothing, health, education, transport, security, etc.? What lessons can be learnt from peoples' creativities and the adaptive strategies they evolved over the years in


addressing problems of daily existence? These are some of the questions that scholars need to answer through empirical surveys in their various disciplines. Findings from such studies will help us come to terms with the resilience and robustness of local people in Africa as well as their vulnerability, exclusion and marginalization. Four tasks need to be performed and these are: (i) The need to come to terms with the fact that citizens are sovereign. (ii) The need to pay close attention to the self-organizing and self-governing structures the people have built and sustained over the years. (iii) Identification of what needs to work upon or filter in order to ascertain what to modify, adopt or reject. (iv) Designing institutional mechanism(s) that can bridge the gap between the ruling elite and the local people. The strategies proposed to accomplish these tasks are discussed in the next section.

### **Crossing the Divide Through Polycentric Development Planning**

If it is correct that development is a function of intellectual capacity of any society, then there are strong theoretical reasons to believe that the high number of universities (over 250) and scholars in African should enable the continent to experience a passage to developed society. Similarly, if knowledge is a means to an end (where the end equals development), then African scholars must be concerned with how to develop theories that are relevant to African needs and then pragmatically take such theories and knowledge to Africa's streets, rural areas and other centres of life. To do this, concerted efforts must be directed at bridging the gaps between universities, governments, industries and agricultural sector in Africa. This, invariably, requires the adoption of polycentric development planning with its tremendous capability in reversing societal ills that emanate from centralized development planning.

Polycentric development planning (PDP) is the process of conceptualizing, initiating, executing and monitoring people-centred and community oriented development. It is within the broader tradition of political economy. PDP conceptualizes development based on synergetic interactions of key development actors within development arenas. It deviates from centralized and state-centred development planning that characterizes African state. African Polycentric Development Planning Model (APDPM) is a multidisciplinary and stage-wise poverty reduction process that embraces several models such as African Development Institutional Mechanism (ADIM) (Akinola 2007f), African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) (Akinola 2010a,b), etc.

In order for APDP to be effective, this paper adopts African Development Brain-Box (ADBB) (Akinola 2008p) that can serve as a control unit for the three development players (see Fig. 2). ADBB is conceived as an intellectual center where innovations and new ideas generated by African scholars are adapted through experimental stations on a pilot scale and then send its output to the community where they will benefit the people. ADBB is an innovation center where scholars with new ideas can receive grants and spend some time there to fully develop the ideas.



**Fig. 2: African Development Brain-Box (ADBB)**

Source: Akinola (2008p:186)

Fig. 2 can be operationalised through five steps.

**Step 1:** African scholars should view African realities with intellectual lenses through exogenous variables.


**Step 2:** African scholars generate knowledge. As discussed earlier (under theoretical framework), there are two categories of knowledge that African scholars need to generate, build and develop in order to overcome socioeconomic and political problems in the continent. First are indigenous and endogenous knowledge that local people are using to surmount their daily problems. Second is knowledge generated by African scholars, some of which are on the shelf in libraries, while new ones are needed to be generated.

**Step 3:** African scholars pass knowledge to ADBB where knowledge will be assessed on its strength to resolve specific problem. If the model is found to be good, then it will be experimented at the field. At this stage, industrialists will be involved in fabrication of machine that is necessary to translate the model into reality.

**Step 4:** Universities, being in close contact with governments, should through its adaptive research,

discover the needs of the society, develop new ideas and innovations and send them to ADBB, an African Innovation Center (AIC), which plays moderating influence for knowledge utilization. As shown in Fig. 3, it is ADBB/AIC that will adapt knowledge to reality through its experimental stations and pilot projects for every sector of African economy – social, economic, technological, and political spheres. AIC will have strong community relations such that any innovation coming to it will be quickly fixed up in relevant or demand communities where the idea is needed and can be demonstrated.


**Step 5:** After the pilot project, there is the need for feedback, called cybernetics which will occur at three levels as shown in figure 3. According to Nobert Wener (1986), cybernetics is the scientific study of the way in which information is moved about and controlled in machines, the brain, and the nervous system. It is overarching factor that guarantee stability of objects like vehicles in motion and human beings and animals in movement. In other words, it is a scientific study of human control functions. This could be applied to the functioning of ADBB. ADBB is like a living organism that relies on homeostatic functions or ‘hypothalamus’ in human beings to maintain stability at all times. The feedback on the performance of pilot project will be sent to ADBB, which will lead to the refining of the model/package that will be demonstrated again at the field. The performance of the model shall be evaluated and the report sent to ADBB for further refinement. At this stage, the model should be ready for full replication.



**Fig. 3: Illustration of the Mechanism of ADBB/AIC in taking theories to African Streets**  
 Source: Akinola (2008p:187)

In order to ensure that both African public officials and African scholars develop smooth working relations, an African Development Institutional Mechanism Model (ADIM) is applied (see Fig. 4). With innovation coming from scholars and robust institutional arrangements, it will be easier for government to increase its presence and relevance at the community level. Training programmes in ministries of agriculture, works, health, education, etc., should be executed in the field, in conjunction with working associations on the ground. The trainees should identify specific sites of interests where trainers will demonstrate new ideas to them. Civil servants should spend less time in offices so that their presence can be felt in communities where they are connected with the people.

Experiences gathered through these contacts with academics should be shared with the community members.



**Fig. 4: African Development Institutional Mechanism (ADIM)**

**Source: Akinola 2007f:231, 2008p:188**

In order to restructure the public sphere in Africa, African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) is adopted for application (Akinola (2010a:,b).

#### **African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM)**


African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) is conceptualised as a deliberate act of setting up self-governing community assembly (SGCA) for deliberation, collegiality, mutual trust, reciprocity and shared community of understanding. APSRM emphasises two elements – deliberation and deliberateness/action. APSRM requires that African scholars should take the lead in this new arrangement. It derives inspirations and working mechanisms from twelve (12) African development models (Akinola 2007f,g,j; 2008f,m,o). The twelve (12) models are: (1) African

Intellectual Gap Measurement Model (AGIMM) for measuring intellectual potentials and relevance of African universities as well as intellectual gap(s) among African scholars with the aim of reforming African educational curriculum and making African scholarship problem-solving and solution seeking (see Akinola 2010f for details on this model); (2) African Development Institutional Mechanism (ADIM) for connecting all the stakeholders in development at various levels of decision making (Akinola 2007f); (3) African Polycentric Information Networking (APIN) for creating networks between the leaders and the people for effective information sharing and communication (Akinola 2007g); (4) African Food Security Model (AFSM) for securing food for the citizens (Akinola 2008f,o); (5) African Employment Generation Model (AEGM) for generating employment opportunities (Akinola 2008f); (6) African Conflict Prevention and Peace Building (ACPPB) for detecting and preventing conflict as well as building peace (Akinola 2007g); (7) African Sustainable Environment Model (ASEM) for conserving and protecting environmental resources (Akinola 2007h); (8) African Road Triology (ART) for building cost effective and durable roads (Akinola 1998); (9) African Community-Initiatives and Development Model (ACID) for empowering the people economically and reducing poverty (Akinola (2000:186-187); (10) African Electoral Reform and Democratisation (ARED) for inclusive democratisation (Akinola 2008p, 2009b,i); (11) African Local Economic Development Strategy (ALEDS) for enhancing economic growth through local industrialization and sustaining development (Akinola 2006j; 2007f:233; 2007g, 2008c); and (12) African Polycentric Privatisation Model (APPM) for distributing the benefits of economic growth among the citizenry (Akinola 2007f:233).

African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) is diagrammatized in Fig. 5. The first part of the diagram displays the failure of structurally-defective public landscape and public policies in Africa as exemplified by parallel operations of the four terrains of public landscape (civil society; economic society; political society and public sphere) that has resulted into elite dominated economy and socio-economic and political crisis, which have, in turn deepened poverty and heightened human misery in Africa. This failure calls for a paradigm shift in governance structure to a new institutional arrangement whereby the efforts of the participants in the public terrains – politicians, bureaucrats, technocrats, multinationals, scholars and citizens – are synergized through public sphere restructuring mechanism (the second part). APSRM suggests that the first step is a value re-orientation among African scholars and then among other participants. This new orientation, invariably, determines: (a) the ability of African scholars to take theories to the streets

and applied them for the benefit of the citizenry; (b) the synergy between and among African scholars and public officials in executing socio-economic and political projects; (c) the relevance and indispensability of community self-governing institutions in socio-economic, political and technological decision making; and (d) the centrality and imperativeness of community assembly for the resolution of socio-economic and political crisis.

The outcome of the restructuring is in three parts: (i) rule making at all levels of decision-making (constitutional, collective choice and operational) at the community assembly; (ii) new institutional arrangements would reflect integrative constitutional order in socio-economic and political realms; and (iii) deliberateness – joint action and synergy by the three groups (scholars, public officials and representatives of community self-governing institutions). After the institutional arrangement has been designed, operational strategy for implementation of any programme/project (e.g. employment generation, food security, poverty reduction, etc) can then be fashioned out (see Akinola 2007f,g; 2008b). It is at this stage that any of the twelve models can be applied to specific action situations.



**Fig. 5: African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM)**

Source: Akinola (2010a:76).

### **Implementation Strategy for Polycentric Development Planning and Self-Governance**

In the light of the above, it is clear that the crisis of development in Africa could be addressed if a new institutional arrangement and planning mechanisms that are capable of bringing all the stakeholders together for regular discussions and decision making are designed and implemented. Such a public sphere restructuring mechanism should regard the existing self-organizing and self-governing arrangements as well as associational life that have proved effective as building blocks for re-constituting democratic order from the bottom up in Africa. The self-governing institutions can act as checks and balances on the local government officials. Much might be made of community-level government both to enhance “voice” and to improve local governance. A community assembly that comprises officials of governments, as well as representatives of various groups and associations in Africa should be established. Since no two communities are ever the same, cultural diversity that characterised Africa is quite easily captured in a polycentric system with its multi-layer and multi-centre relationships and interactions.

In self-governing systems, citizens, interacting through appropriate institutional arrangements, engage in rule making at all levels of decision-making (operational, collective choice, and constitutional) and within all scales or domains (neighbourhood, township, local government or district, state/province, national, and supranational). Boundaries between the three decision making levels are blurred. Depending on the activity at hand, two or all the three actions can take place within a particular scale or domain. The IAD framework, however, differentiates between three levels of interaction – constitutional, collective choice and operational – that function concurrently.

At the constitutional level lies the system that determines how rules are made and can be modified. At the heart of effective governance of Africa is the imperativeness of constitutional reform which can be accomplished through polycentric privatization and local industrialization. It is important to emphasise here that constitutional reform should be tied to specific task – programme or project – so that the actors can play practical role in the process. The effectiveness of this strategy has been proved in an experiment performed in Irepodun Local Government area of Osun State, Nigeria between 2005 and 2006 by the author (Akinola 2007f:230). Based on the Irepodun experience, the adoption of polycentric privatization strategy could avail the citizens in Africa the opportunities to dialogue in community assembly and jointly take decision on how resources are to be allocated and utilized as well as on other socio-economic and political activities.

At the collective choice level, rules that define and constrain the actions of individuals and citizens have to be established. At the operational level, concrete actions have to be undertaken by those individuals most directly affected, or by public officials (McGinnis 1999a). This can then be applied to different sectors of the economy in the Africa – employment generation, food security, poverty reduction, road development, environmental management, electoral reform and democratisation, conflict detection, prevention and resolution, etc.

It is believed that when the participants and stakeholders at the community assembly are able to sit together, discuss their common problems and craft working rules together, a shared community of understanding will be established. The interactions between the governments, universities and community self-governing institutions will eventually produce new working relations that will be people-oriented. For governance to benefit the people it has to proceed from the people, be guided by them, and they should be able to modify the governing institutions as their situations change. The argument is that if Africa wants to address the problems of infrastructural deprivation, corruption, environmental degradation, conflict, poverty and hunger, it needs to learn how to make efficient use of its physical, human, and institutional resources. Experiences of community-based institutions through self-organizing and self-governing capabilities in meeting common challenges in the delivery of common goods and social services need to be taken into consideration in policy formulation. It is these people-designed and people-oriented structures that can be regarded as building blocks for the emergence of people-centred and self-governing public sphere capable of reconstituting democratic order from the bottom-up in Africa. Political leaders should realise that the more inclusive the marginalized groups in the political system, the less opposition they (leaders) face and the more time they (leaders) have to devote to address issues on community affairs.

### **African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM)**


African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM) is designed to assess the performance of African politicians at the constituency level. APPAM conceptualizes politician performance as a function of the impact of development projects on citizens' welfare. It mirrors citizens' welfare from the impact of development projects at community level (Akinola 2010f). The model raises some fundamental questions:

- (a) To what extent have development projects influenced socio-economic livelihoods of

citizens?

- (b) To what extent are citizens involved in budgetary preparation, expenditure and monitoring?
- (c) To what extent are citizens involved in decision making, especially on project planning, implementation and monitoring.
- (d) Are there non-partisan fora where citizens are able to contest ideas and share their views with elected officials?

Answers to these questions are encapsulated by African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM) as illustrated in Fig. 6.



**Fig. 6: African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM)**  
 Source: Akinola (2010f)

Fig. 6 has two components: (a) The challenges and problematics of development in Africa and (b) Solution seeking as a way forward. The problematics of development in Africa are a reflection of both theory and practice of democracy in the continent. Democracy in most African countries is located in-between authoritarianism and real democracy. This is called democratic tyranny where 'majority' carries the vote through electoral violence, money-bags politics, party patronage, clientelism and godfatherism. Armed gangs, thugs and hooligans are used to intimidate opponents and later to abandon them after winning elections. Political deception and self-deception are used to tranquillize, tease, and terrorize the mind of citizens into states of helplessness; politicians exploit the ignorance of the people and monopolise political market-place and economic opportunities, while citizens are complacent and apathetic.

These problems require the intervention of African scholars, Self-Governing Institutions<sup>13</sup> (SGIs), NGOs, etc. by engaging in solution-seeking and problem-solving entrepreneurship through brainstorming. The main task of the brainstorming session is to establish effective information networking by adopting African Polycentric Information Networking (APIN)<sup>14</sup> (see for details in Akinola 2008p:188-189; 2009b:94). According to Fig. 6, in order to address the problem of democratic tyranny and elusive development, APPAM derives inspirations from APIN that, in turn, serves as foundation for the formation of Self-Governing Community Assembly (SGCA). It is at the SGCA that citizens and public officials/politicians interact to produce and implement people oriented policies. One way of doing this is by empowering citizens to assess politicians' performance by using Politician Score Card (PSC).

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<sup>13</sup> A self-governing institution (SGI) is defined as an institution crafted by the people, without external interference, in an attempt to solve their common problems within their locality or community. It is also called a people-oriented, people-centered, or community-based institution (Akinola 2005; Ayo 2002; McGinnis 1999; Olowu and Wunsch 2004; E. Ostrom 1990, 1999; E. Ostrom, J. Walker, and R. Gardner 1992; V. Ostrom 1994, 1997, 2000; V. Ostrom and E. Ostrom 2003; Sawyer 2005; Wunsch and Olowu 1995). These institutions, on the basis of their origins, are classified into two broad categories: indigenous and endogenous (see for details, Akinola 2008b:95; 2009b:87).

<sup>14</sup> African Polycentric Information Networking (APIN) initiates and strengthens linkages and interactions between individuals and self-governing institutions. The beauty of polycentricity is in its multifarious connections and interactive links that all members of a particular community have to receive information, interact and make contributions to decision making and conflict resolution. For example, decision taken or information passed in a polycentric system has the possibility of reaching every member of a community through, at least, four of eight channels (see for details Akinola 2008p:188-189; 2009b:94). The linkages and interactions can then be connected to the state structure of governance. The networks once established can be useful at various domains of human interactions in specific African countries, from state/provincial to local/community levels.

### **Self-Governing Community Assembly (SGCA)**

As Vincent Ostrom (2000:271) has reminded us, the challenge in democratic societies is to extend the horizons of knowledge and skills by learning to work with others in ways that enhance error-correcting capabilities. It is, therefore, imperative to set up a system of checks and balances that characterised pre-colonial African political system and adopt it for citizens' enlightenment on socio-economic and techno-political affairs. This requires the setting up of SGCA as contained in Akinola (2010a). To hearken to the words of Vincent Ostrom (2000), constructing democracies through the science of citizenship and civic enlightenment within and outside schools (formal and informal) requires cooperation and deliberation among leaders and citizens at the SGCA. The SGCA is composed of representatives of governments with their agencies, higher institutions, community institutions, occupational groups, women groups, youth, etc.). Since SGCA is a multi-tasks assembly, one of its operations will have to do with education and enlightenment of citizens so that public officials and the people operate within shared communities of understanding. This is because people are the human resource for the supply of physical labour, technical and professional skills which are germane to effective and efficient planning and implementation of development policies, programmes, projects and daily activities. Some of the critical questions that citizens need to address at the SGCA include:

1. What should governments do in terms of human resources development and utilization and how should they do it?
2. What can people do alone without government intervention?
3. What can people do in tandem with government?
4. What can people do in conjunction with local industries?
5. What can people do with agricultural and other natural resources in their communities?
6. How can people handle these issues in numbers 1 to 5?
7. What should be the role of local people in shaping electoral system before, during and after elections?

Similarly, citizens should be prepared to engage in productive economic activities as they are made to open up through the operations of SGCA, especially in food security and development programmes. Professionals who are indigenes (but reside outside their communities) need to be encouraged to come home and share their experiences with their people on project management and

other issues of life that pertain to governance of community affairs. Both leaders and citizens need new orientations, which require some training at the level of SGCA. The leaders need new orientation in community governance and management of community affairs. Leaders should come down to the level of citizens (as exemplified in African Electoral Reform and Democratisation model (ARED) – Akinola 2008p:192-193; 2009b:98; 2010g), while citizens need to be prepared for regular dialogues with their leaders. It is important at this juncture to point out that many citizens of Nigeria are ignorant of the fact that they have the civil rights to attend their local government meetings and that they have the right to ask the management of a local government questions about its revenue and expenditure. In the words of Aluko (2006:121), Nigerians and their African counterparts, even though they are aware of the corruption in their local government, prefer to “leave it to God” to judge the erring politicians. Invariably, citizens have concluded that corruption is an institutionalised way of life for public officers. This parochially institutionalized mentality should change.

When citizens are able to realise and take full responsibilities in shaping and re-shaping socio-economic and techno-political configurations to suit their daily aspirations and yearnings through active and constructive interjections, then shared communities of understanding will be established. This will provide fertile ground for the adoption of successful practices elsewhere such as Alaska solution (see Akinola 2008i). Communication both in words and deeds between leaders and citizens should not be abstract; they should be in tangible forms – goods and services. The provision and quality of goods and services should form the basis for assessing politicians’ performance by citizens.

### **Assessment of Politician Performance**

Using Politician Score Card (PSC), all members of SGCA must score their elected officers/representatives at all levels at least quarterly on their performance. Indices of assessment should include, among others, the frequency of visits by leaders to the constituency/community, language of communication, ability and willingness to listen to the people, innovative ideas, ability to show the way forward, number of projects executed and their conditions, etc. All these determine the degree of politician performance. In order to determine the closeness of politician to his/her constituency, Politician Attachment Index (PAI) is designed.

PAI is derived from politician weight on tripod balance scale (political party, house of assembly and constituency). For instance, if a politician attends a political meetings at party level and a meeting at house of assembly level, he/she should, of necessity, feature at constituency level in order to balance the equation of political tripod balance scale (PTBS). Politician Attachment Index is calculated as the number of visits to constituency divided by the number of meetings at House of Assembly plus the number of party meetings, and expressed in Equation I as:

$$\text{Politician Attachment Index (PAI)} = \frac{\text{NVC}}{\text{NHA} + \text{NPP}} \quad \text{Equation I}$$

Where,

NVC = No. of visits to the Constituency

NHA = No. of meetings at the House of Assembly

NPP = No. of meetings at Political Party level

For example, if a politician attends 10 political meetings at party level, 10 meetings at house of assembly level and features 20 times at constituency level, then his PAI will be equal to 1 (i.e.  $20/10+10 = 1$ ). This is a perfect case.

In order to calculate PSC, other variables to consider include:

1. Decision making (DM) on projects (exclusion = 0; at SGCA with good participation = 3).
2. Number of new projects after assumption of office by the politician (NP).
3. Progress rate of projects versus people's expectation (PR).

The result of hypothetical example is contained in Table 1:

Table 1: Hypothetical Example of Calculation of PSC

S/N	Variables	Performance Scores			
		Poor	Fair	Good	Excellent
1	Decision Making (DM)	0	1	2	3
2	New Projects (NP)	0	1	2	3
3	Progress Rate (PR)	0	1	2	3
	Total	0	3	6	9

$$\text{Politician Score Card (PSC)} = \text{PAI (DM+NP+PR)} \quad - \text{Equation II}$$

Using the example of three politicians A, B and C, the PSCs of the three politicians are illustrated

below:

Politician A with PAI = 1, with excellent score of 9 will have  $PSC = 1(9) = 9$

Politician B with PAI = 0.5, with good score of 6 will have  $PSC = 0.5(6) = 3$

Politician C with PAI = 0.2, with fair score of 3 will have  $PSC = 0.2(3) = 0.6$

A PSC of less than 5.0 is considered a non-performing case. For instance, when a politician scores 9 (highest point) on projects and his PAI is on the average (0.5), his PSC is 4.5 (less than 5.0), he is still considered a non-performer because his absence is not felt enough at the constituency. The essence of this assessment is to ensure that politicians are in close contact with their constituencies and communities. The results of this exercise will determine the relevance of politicians to their community, thus, helping politicians to make adjustment in their conducts by ensuring effective utilization of local resources towards entrepreneurial development, techno-economic opportunities and citizens' empowerment. If for instance, a politician refuses to adjust in his/her conducts and become recalcitrant, the people will pass vote of no confidence in him/her and he/she can be recalled for fresh election to take place.

The outcome of SGCA and PSC activities is the restructuring which is the emergence of new institutional arrangements that would reflect integrative constitutional order in socio-economic and techno-political realms. It is this joint action and synergy by all the groups (scholars, public officials and representatives of community self-governing institutions, CSOs, NGOs) that would eventually determine how government policies in all spheres of life are to be formulated and implemented. After the institutional arrangement has been designed, operational strategy for implementation of any programme/project (e.g. employment generation, food security, road development, poverty reduction, environmental management, electoral reform and democratisation, conflict detection, prevention and resolution, etc.) can then be fashioned out (see Akinola 2007f; 2008b,p). It is at this stage that any of the fourteen (14) models can be applied to any of the specific action situations. For example, African Electoral Reform and Democratisation (ARED) could be applied for connecting all the political stakeholders in development and governance at various levels of decision making for enhancing public accountability. Similarly, African Local Economic Development Strategy (ALEDS) could be applied for enhancing economic growth through local industrialization, while African Polycentric Privatization Model (APPM) would help in distributing the benefits of economic growth, thereby empowering the people economically and reducing poverty. The

application of African Food Security Model (AFSM) would ensure food security for the citizens, while African Employment Generation Model (AGEM) would generate employment opportunities for unemployed youth, etc.

It is apposite at this juncture to demonstrate how African Food Security Model (AFSM) can be implemented in Africa.

### **African Food Security Model and Implementation Strategy**

In order to address the problems of disconnect, polycentric planning and polycentric privatization that could break the monopolistic profiteering of both local and international capitalist bourgeoisies should be adopted. At the international level, it is important to terminate the vicious cycle of exploitation and underdevelopment by processing food crops into semi-finished and finished products before packaging them for export. To this end, African Food Security Model (AFSM) is designed for application.

### **African Food Security Model (AFSM)**

African Food Security Model (AFSM) is conceptualized as the combination of factors of production (land, labour, capital, entrepreneurship and technology) through appropriate institutional mechanisms that synergize the efforts of the key stakeholders (governments, universities/polytechnics, industrialists and farmers) in food production (process and storage). AFSM is diagrammatized in Fig. 7. The first part of the diagram displays the failure of conventional food security policies in Africa as exemplified by parallel operations of the stakeholders that has resulted into food crisis. This failure calls for a paradigm shift in food security to a new institutional arrangement whereby the efforts of the stakeholders are synergized through food security mechanism (the second part). AFSM suggests that the first step is a value re-orientation. Extractive economies that dominate parts of Africa do nothing to promote entrepreneurship, ingenuity or creativity in Africa. A shift towards the more inward-looking and utilization of abundant agricultural resources through adaptive technology to promote agriculture would boost local industrialization.

This new orientation, invariably, determines: (1) the utilization of agricultural resources; (2) the development of adaptive technology and (3) the ownership of local food industries through

shareholding (polycentric privatization). Abundant agricultural resources can only be utilized to the fullest capacity if technology is adapted for planting, harvesting, processing and storage. Emphasis should be shifted from 'developing technology for society' to 'developing technology in the society' in order to address societal needs more effectively. This notion is supported by Feenberg (1999, 2002) when he suggests that technology development is a practise of co-creation involving social and material aspects, social and natural sciences, and societal and technological developments. Similarly, Ruivenkamp (2003) emphasized that technology has to be developed with intended users and thereby creating the environment needed for adoption; people wanting technology that are developed together with them.

AFSM believes that appropriate technology is a pre-requisite of local industrialization. This, in turn, should be pursued through polycentric privatization to enable local citizens to be joint owners of local industries. Invariably, polycentric privatization would enable the redistribution of the outcome of economic growth. Thus, the present centralized privatization programme that perpetuates inequality among the peoples of Africa would be reversed and wealth creation becomes possible for peasants and citizens. The outcome of the new institutional arrangements is in two parts: (a) processed agricultural products, consumption of products, and exports of the products; and (b) employment generation, bonus and dividends to shareholders; and wealth creation. Only then would Africans put a premium on consumption of local products since they are owners of these industries that produce the goods.

In polycentric arrangements, privatization of local industries and enterprises can enable the transitional poor to move out of poverty as it opens opportunities not only to be co-owners of food investments but also employment in local industries and factories. In order to cater for the residual poor, food centres should be established in towns and cities, and manned by people of integrity. Tax reduction should be given to companies, organizations and individuals that donate food to these centres and such food could be sold to the poor at considerably reduced prices. Developed nations already employ this strategy to cater for the poor. When local people have access to employment opportunities and receive bonus and dividends from local investments, wealth is invariably created, the people are economically empowered and, in the long run, poverty will be reduced across Africa. The overall outcome of all these is food security and poverty reduction (see also Akinola 2008p:191-192).

It is apposite at this juncture to emphasize that institutional arrangement to ensure sustainable food production requires four fundamental imperatives of collective action within food security arena. These are collegiality, mutual trust, reciprocity and shared community of understanding (see Akinola 2007f:225). It is the realization of these imperatives through effective polycentric planning and institutional arrangement that can enable African leaders and their peoples to work together to achieve food security for the continent. However, this requires the restructuring of the public sphere (for details, see Akinola 2010a,b) that can enable citizens and their leaders to deliberate, according to rules that are agreed upon, as a way of broadening the public agenda on food security.

### **Implementation of Food Security Strategy at University Level in Africa**

This section is concerned with how any African university can kick start food security programmes by applying AFSM at university level. The proposal is designed to experiment food security project in specific food related areas using university initiatives. This experiment would: (1) demonstrate how to develop entrepreneurial capability by combining factors of production (land, labour and capital) toward food production; and (2) how to establish university/industry partnerships in translating innovative ideas into machines that are capable of enhancing agricultural productivity.

The five factors of production are essential for the take off of the proposed project. Such a university should acquire sufficient parcel of land for the programme while labour could be sourced within the community in which the university is located. In order to embark on this proposed project, the university in question should seek the services of agricultural experts and then employ farm managers, farm supervisors, etc. Within the academia, agricultural engineers, food scientists, and food technologists would have to be involved in the design of machines<sup>15</sup> for food processing, food storage and food packages. PPPRS as an adaptation strategy relies on innovation from higher institutions as well as local knowledge and initiatives that are imperatives for utilizing vast agricultural resources and appropriate technologies for food security. The implementation strategy of the proposed project at the university level spans four stages.

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<sup>15</sup> The machines could be imported, understudied and adapted to Africa's ecological and socio-cultural settings.

### First Stage: The Establishment of Commercial Farm Unit (CFU) and Industrial Estate Unit (IEU) at University Level.

The first step to be taken at this stage is to establish Commercial Farm Unit (CFU) and Industrial Estate Unit (IEU) at the university level. Second, the university should establish linkages with specific industries for fabrication and production of machines and equipment with a view to meeting the needs of specific aspects of food security – production, processing and storage of crops, fruits, poultry, fishery, etc. Academics that are able to bring out new ideas and/or innovations relating to industrialization and food security (product and process innovations) would be given grants and incentives to improve on their work. The profit-sharing formula of the programme would be based on the principle of ‘you get as much as you put in.’ Food-related activities that could be embarked upon include: (i) Large-scale mechanized farms in the cultivation of yam, cassava, maize, guinea corn, fruits, etc. (ii) Food processing – yam flour, cassava flour, maize, guinea corn, fruits, etc. (iii) Animal husbandry – fishery, poultry, rabbitry, pigry, goatry, cattle and other ruminants.

### Second Stage: Fund Generation

Initially, the cost of the project should be borne by the university. As the project records success and expands, interested persons within the university should be given opportunity to buy shares, (no matter how small), including workers at the Commercial Farm and Industrial Estate, meaning that ownership of the investment would be shared.

### Third Stage: Training of Staff

Special training should be organized for the new staff of the project and it is important that the staff as a group visits places like Songhai Centre, Porto Novo, Republic of Benin; Leventis Farm at Agenebode in Edo State and Zimbabwean farms in Shonga (or Tsonga) in Edu Local Government Area of Kwara State, Nigeria; the White’s farms in South Africa, etc. Part of the task to be carried out for industrial activities would include the identification of the types of agricultural resources that are available within the locality and the use to which they could be put.

### Fourth Stage: Project Implementation Stage – Pilot Project

At this stage, food related firms/industries on which decisions have been taken (to be established) in the university should commence operation as pilot projects in the following stages: (1) Planning and costing of projects on food-related firms/industries, (2) Sitting of firms and industries within

university land, (3) Fund generation and resources mobilization, (4) Purchase and installation of machines for industries, (5) Recruitment and training of staff for industries, (6) Commissioning of industries, (7) Commencement of evaluation of the performance of industries – data collection, analysis and findings. The findings will be used to produce training and re-training manuals for workers and also as teaching and research materials for students and faculty, and (8) Workshop on re-training of the key actors and/or staff of industries.

### **Implementation Process for PPPRS on Food Security at Local Government/Community Level in Africa**

This section is concerned with how the university could use its experience gathered from the application of AFSM in its commercial farm and industrial estate for the implementation of PPPRS at the local government/community level. At the community level (the second level of action), the university acting as a facilitator should use a local government or a community as a platform to implement the same strategy that it has adopted to initiate community-based food security programmes. Further, the university should facilitate the establishment of partnerships among stakeholders in food security – scholars, industrialists, peasant farmers, interest groups (like co-operative societies, private organizations) and individuals. PPPRS would enable governments and other stakeholders play complementary and symbiotic roles, especially, in setting up processing and other agro-based industries thereby creating job opportunities for the people at the local level in selected communities. Similarly, PPPRS would help in creating opportunities for farmers and other citizens to jointly own agro-based industries through shareholding (polycentric privatization), thus constituting the drivers of economic forces at the various local economic centres in the local government areas. This, invariably, would enable the local government to be financially buoyant and self-reliant. Further, at the third level of action, the university should initiate and implement community-based investment projects to generate employment opportunities for citizens in selected communities.

In order to implement this strategy, innovative approach, based on new knowledge, should be adopted. The result of experiments on application of polycentric privatization in Irepodun Investment Cooperation in Nigeria should be regarded as a new way of thinking through problems in Africa. The lessons learnt so far can then be used in implementing similar projects in specific countries across Africa. Attention should be directed towards indigenous and endogenous

institutions that the people have evolved in coping with the problems of daily existence. (Akinola 2008p:193).


The methodology proposed for the implementation of PPPRS embraces direct contact and (working in) collaboration with the people at the grassroots level through the various groups, interests and associations/organizations (- farmers' association) within local communities in an integrated fashion. Without involving the local people through shareholding, it might be difficult for investment to be sustainable at the community level in Africa. The reason is that factories and industries that exclude the people from ownership framework will thrive at the expense of the welfare of the people and consequently likely to be prone to theft and vandalization as the case of Niger Delta in Nigeria. The argument is that food crisis in Africa can only be addressed if appropriate institutional mechanism capable of enabling key food security stakeholders to operate in synergy and harness food security potentials is designed and implemented.

The implementation strategy of the proposed project is highlighted under fifteen stages (for details, see Akinola 2008p:194-195). Based on the experience of the university in its Commercial Farm and Industrial Estate, one or two local governments/communities could be selected for the implementation of the ideas on food security. This can be done by creating incentives for institutional actors from academic and private sectors. One way of starting is that the institution could provide seed money for the project. At the local government/community level, the programme should be owned by the stakeholders. Similarly, the organizational structure of the proposed enterprise would be fashioned out. All the groups would work together and form four committees: Economic Planning Committee, Implementation Committee, Monitoring Committee and Peace Building Committee. The task of these committees would include: (i) what people can do together (common-pool resources), (ii) ownership of such enterprises – jointly owned by the people (individuals, groups, local governments etc.), (iii) the cost and execution of projects, (iv) monitoring of the projects and (v) conflict detection, prevention and resolution.

Similarly, certain tasks that need to be performed are: (a) election of officers for the company; (b) crafting of the company's constitution; (c) resources mobilization in forms of sale of shares; and (d) the establishment of factories and industries, etc. On the basis of the amount of money realized through the sale of shares, decision on projects to be embarked upon would be taken after feasibility

reports on possible projects might have been prepared. Recruitment of workers into the company will also commence and will continue as the need arises. At the same time, construction of projects (food processing, fruit processing, fishpond, feed mills, poultry, rabbitry, goatry, snailry, etc.) will commence. The evaluation of the pilot project will start some months after implementation. This should be followed by project revision. Here, all lessons from the pilot projects will be used to improve the future design of the projects. The last step is concerned with project replication. At this stage, individual Local Government (LG), or a group of LGs along with groups/associations, industrialists and individuals can proceed with establishing their firms and industries, which should be jointly owned through shareholding.

The whole idea is diagrammatically expressed in the model (Fig. 7) showing the relationships between the university/polytechnics and industrialists as the first level of action, while Fig. 8 demonstrates the process of implementing PPPRS for food security as the second level of action at the local government/community level. At the same time, the model illustrates the application of PPPRS in relation to the pursuance of the actualization of five important issues: (1) re-orientation of values; (2) creation of wealth; (3) generating employment; (4) providing affordable food for the poor; and (5) reducing poverty.



**Fig. 7: African Food Security Model (AFSM)**

Source: Adapted from Akinola (2007f:233).




Fig. 8: The Process of Polycentric Planning and Poverty Reduction Strategy for Food Security in Africa.

Source: Adapted from Akinola (2008p:196).

### **Implementation Options**

Since the African state has not delivered as expected, and considering the fact that diverse peoples of the continent in their ecological and cultural settings, over the years, have relied on self-organised institutions, otherwise called civic democracy to address their problems of daily existence (Akinola 2008b, 2009a,b, 2010a,b), it is imperative to use these local and community initiatives and self-governing arrangements as building blocks for the emergence of modern democracy and economic development in the continent. This paper generates two options on the implementation of the ideas contained in this paper.

**Option A** – African governments, NEPAD, AU and other international organizations can implement these innovative ideas. Besides, consultancy outfits based in African universities can adopt these strategies in collaboration with African governments and NGOs to resolving socio-economic and techno-political challenges in the continent. Invariably, such universities through their consultancy services would be able to generate enormous resources in terms of finance to further strengthening their research base and thus become financially buoyant.

**Option B** – Based on experience in Nigeria, African governments, in their present structures, may not be able to adopt these models and strategies because of secrecy and ulterior motives. The reason is that all these ideas have been sent to the Nigerian governments (at all levels) and their agencies, especially on the Niger Delta case from 1992 to date but their responses have been appalling and dampening. I have made not less than twenty three (23) attempts – developed problem-solving proposals and sent them to Nigerian governments either physically or by courier service. My suggestion, therefore, is that instead of waiting for government, some scholars, patriotic individuals, community leaders, etc. can spearhead the implementation of these strategies on a pilot scale. The outcome of pilot projects will enlighten the people on how to address these challenges, and in the long run, the people will be able to exert their demands on the elected officials. It is enlightened citizens that are able to pursue development agenda in constructive manners. When citizens are equipped with effective strategies of development, then the matter of community governance becomes easier as citizens will be able to effectively check their leaders on the conduct of community affairs.

## Conclusion

This paper concludes that institutional crisis and structurally-defective governance has engendered wide gap between African leaders and the citizenry on the one hand, and between resources/development potentials and welfare-oriented development on the other hand, thus perpetuating inequality in Africa. Consequently, the problem of disconnect and alienation that were manifested in various sectors of the economy have rendered impotent development planning strategies in Africa and, thus, culminate into socio-economic and techno-political crises, deepened poverty and high level of human misery and insecurity. These inadequacies on the part of African states have given room for local people to craft self-organizing arrangements, shared strategies and problem-solving interdependencies and thereby performed better in responding to community needs and aspirations than governments and their agencies.

Since governance crisis is predicated upon institutional dilemma, without integrative institutional arrangement to re-order African governance system, economic prosperity is foregone in the continent. This paper, therefore, calls attention to polycentric development planning and decision making arrangements whereby community self-governing institutions could play critical and indispensable role by bringing the people into the main stream of socio-economic and techno-political decisions, thereby synergizing the efforts of the African-state, universities and community institutions through bottom-up and integrative planning. The paper adopts African Development Brain-Box (ADBB) that relies on Polycentric Development Planning (PDP) in synergising the efforts of the key stakeholders in harnessing natural resources and development potentials in Africa.

It is in the light of this exigency that this paper further adopts African Public Sphere Restructuring Model (APSRM) that could help in restructuring the public sphere for synergy. APSRM derives inspirations and workability mechanisms from twelve (12) African development models that cut across several sectors of the economy in Africa. Similarly, African Politician Performance Assessment Model (APPAM) is suggested for assessing the performance of African politicians at the constituency level. The common denominator to all these models is polycentric planning and poverty reduction strategy that emphasizes the centrality of community self-governing institutions in reconstituting democratic order from the bottom-up in Africa.

The required thing to do is to apply these models and others developed by scholars on pilot scale

so that findings and experiences gathered from these pilot cases will help in refining and modifying the models for full replication across the continent. In the final analysis, experiences gathered will be used to reform African educational curricula in universities. At the university level, revised curriculum will enable African universities to take appropriate decisions on their programmes on how to use local resources to the benefit of the people. Furthermore, the result of such exercises will help decision makers on how to fund education towards problem-solving scholarship. These, however, depend on the formulation of appropriate policies backed up with effective monitoring on implementation as this will help African countries to overcome the problem of colonial intellectual syndrome and intellectual poverty. The benefit of these models, especially ADIM and ADBB is that they enhance policy effectiveness because the ideas are experimented first with citizens at community level and then progress to the pilot scale before full implementation.

Specifically, the paper employs African Food Security Model (AFSM) that focuses on the mechanism to combine factors of production. It is believed that any university that is interested could kick-start the implementation of this innovative idea by applying AFSM. Outside the university, this proposal is designed for implementation at the local government/community level in Africa. The institutional arrangements proposed for local government/community level, if adopted, would help create opportunities for farmers, local associations, interest groups and other citizens to jointly own agro-based industries through shareholding. Collegial interactions between governments, universities/polytechnics, industries, local communities and peasant farmers in their present day realities constitute indispensable factors of food security and poverty reduction in Africa. By networking with stakeholders, agricultural innovations from universities would be developed by industrialists and consequently, popularized by governments among farmers. The adoption of innovations by peasant farmers would help in transforming agricultural resources into semi-finished and/or finished products at farm sites. This will guarantee utilization of local resources, reduce wastages, strengthen economic capacity of rural dwellers and thus, enhance higher productivity in farming and food security. Invariably, this would generate employment for local people, enhance local economic empowerment, reduce rural-urban drift and increase the living standards of the people in Africa. At the end of the day, the application of these development strategies would help in actualizing five important issues: (1) re-orientation of values; (2) food security; (3) wealth creation; (4) employment generation; and (5) poverty reduction. Invariably, this strategy would help in constituting communities as engineers and drivers of economic forces at

various local governments in Africa. If this is achieved, the emergence of community self-governing institutions in Africa can be regarded as a new effort at creating an alternative model of African continent built from the grassroots to the national and continental levels.

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